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It's an absurd and astonishing fact about current constitutional law that
it still hasn't answered, and can't answer, the most basic questions about
privatization.
We know the ratio between American soldiers and American private
military contractors in the Iraq war: one to one.' We know the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) used such contractors to interrogate-and in some
cases apparently to torture-captives.2 But thirteen years after Abu Ghraib,
we still don't know whether the contractors working there3 were "state
actors."
If a city privatized its entire police force, replacing it with private
security contractors, existing Supreme Court case law suggests that the
private officers would not be state actors, meaning they could arrest and
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and Gideon Yaffe, as well as the terrific editors of the Texas Law Review.
1. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUBL'N No. 3053, CONTRACTORS' SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS
IN IRAQ 8 (2008), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/08-
12-iraqcontractors.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G3Q-BPK6].
2. See, e.g., S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM, S. REP. NO. 113-288, at
84-85 (2014) (detailing certain enhanced interrogation techniques used by the CIA and its
contractors on detainees); GEORGE R. FAY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF
THE ABU GHRAtB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 47-48
(2004) (observing that "[c]ontracting-related issues contributed to the problems at Abu Ghraib
prison"); Simon Chesterman, 'We Can't Spy ... If We Can't Buy!': The Privatization ofIntelligence
and the Limits of Outsourcing 'Inherently Governmental Functions', 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1055,
1062-64 (2008) (observing many allegations of abuse by contractors).
3. See FAY, supra note 2, at 47-48 ("Several of the alleged perpetrators of the abuse of detainees
[at Abu Ghraib] were employees of government contractors.").
4. In 2009, a district court in Virginia stated that contract interrogators at Abu Ghraib were
"private actors." Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2009).
Six years later, the same court found that the military had exercised "plenary" and "direct" control
over the contractors-but therefore dismissed the case on political question grounds. Shimari v.
CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 434, 443 (E.D. Va. 2015); see Laura A. Dickinson, The
State Action Doctrine in International Law, in 56 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY,
SPECIAL ISSUE: HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW POSSIBILITIES/NEW PROBLEMS 213, 219 (2011) (concluding
that it is unclear whether private military contractors are state actors under current U.S.
constitutional law).
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search with constitutional abandon.5 I'm not saying courts would so hold. I
assume they wouldn't. But current state action doctrine actually points to that
Constitution-gutting conclusion.6
The privatization black hole at the heart of constitutional law is well
known.' "There is no accepted constitutional theory," as Professor Kimberly
Brown puts it, "that prohibits Congress or the President from handing off
significant swaths of discretionary governmental power to wholly private
entities that operate beyond the purview of the Constitution."' But the real-
world effects of this black hole are often still missed.
Beginning in 2011, the federal government induced private colleges and
universities all over the country to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and
punish alleged law violations under Title IX of the Educational Amendments
of 1972, conducting secretive trials according to specified procedures,
including a government-dictated standard of proof.' In other words, the
government induced private institutions to do law enforcement on its behalf,
a result achieved not through contract, but by threatening to strip those
institutions of billions of dollars in federal funding.10 This too was a kind of
privatization. "
The existence of state action in the new campus sexual assault trials
should be obvious given that the government not only compelled schools to
conduct them but mandated certain procedures for them. 12 The question is
whether these trials have been violating due process. But courts have refused
5. See infra Section II(A).
6. See infra Section I(A); Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
911, 929-31 (2007) (explaining that the state action doctrine does not categorize private security
guards as government actors); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165,
1253-62 (1999) (summarizing cases holding that private police are not performing a "public
function").
7. See, e.g., Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1169, 1183 (1995) ("The probable consequences of the current doctrine are that
the policies and decisions of enterprises which will be privatized in the future are not likely to be
considered as state actions."); Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and the Structural
Constitution, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 491, 496 (2011) (observing that "the Supreme Court ... has
failed to develop a doctrinal framework for meaningfully scrutinizing transfers of governmental
power to private parties"); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367, 1373 (2003) ("The inadequacies of current state action doctrine mean that private exercises
of government power are largely immune from constitutional scrutiny, and therefore expanding
privatization poses a serious threat to the principle of constitutionally accountable government.").
8. Brown, supra note 7, at 496.
9. See infra Sections I(A), I(B).
10. See infra Sections I(B), 1(B).
11. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1377-79 (discussing the "definitional challenge[s]" posed by
the term privatization and pointing out that in "some privatization contexts, the government does
not provide direct funding but nonetheless uses private entities to achieve its programmatic goals-
for instance, by ... relying on private actors for the content and enforcement of government
regulations").
12. See infra Section I(B).
[Vol. 96:1516
Privatization & State Action
to answer that question on the ground that private colleges and universities
are not state actors-and therefore due process doesn't apply.13
This result is not entirely surprising. If courts did find state action, every
Title IX sexual assault hearing at every private school in the country could
have been affected.14 Findings of guilt might have to be revisited; expulsions
might have to be vacated. District judges have excellent reasons to adhere to
the no-state-action result.
Nevertheless, that result is wrong-and plainly so.
This conclusion will be opposed by Title IX activists, but the truth is it
should be welcome to everyone who, like the author of this Article, backs
stronger policies for, and punishments of, campus sexual assault. There's a
reason the Constitution requires due process. No one is served by faulty,
unreliable adjudication, and the campus trials conducted all over the country
have been so unreliable-in some cases so incompetent, so Kafka-esque-
they would almost be risible, if their effects on the lives of the people they
touch, both alleged victims and alleged perpetrators alike, weren't as
potentially devastating as they are.
Part I summarizes the 2011 Department of Education "Dear Colleague"
letter that brought about the new Title IX campus sexual assault rials. Part II
shows why, under well-established state action doctrine, due process applies
even at private schools to at least some parts of these Title IX trials. But
Part II leaves important questions open--questions that can't be answered
without confronting the more general problem of privatization in
constitutional law. Part III derives principles that would solve that problem,
and Part IV applies these principles, identifying the most serious potential
due process violations in post-2011 campus sexual assault hearings."
13. See infra Section I(C).
14. See infra Section IV(B).
15. On September 22, 2017, as this Article was being edited for publication, the Department of
Education announced that it was "withdrawing" the controversial 2011 Dear Colleague letter. Office
for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Letter Withdrawing 2011 Dear Colleague Letter (Sept. 22,
2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NT7N-28Z4]. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, emphasizing the due process failings
of the current system of campus sexual assault trials, stated that the Department would "launch a
transparent notice-and-comment process" aimed at replacing the provisions of the Dear Colleague
letter with new, as-yet-unspecified regulations. Betsy DeVos, Secretary DeVos Prepared Remarks
on Title IXEnforcement, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Sept. 7,2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/
secretary-devos-prepared-remarks-title-ix-enforcement [https://perma.cc/3VLC-CAP7]; DeVos
Says She'll Rescind Obama's Title IX Sexual Assault Guidance, CBS NEWS (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/devos-to-rescind-obama-era-title-ix-order-on-withholding-
school-funds-for-assault-inaction [https://perma.cc/TE84-J7B7]. The withdrawal of the 2011 Dear
Colleague letter does not remedy any due process violations committed by schools in sexual assault
trials that have taken place, or may still take place, under the flawed procedures imposed on schools
as a result of that letter. The author of this Article hopes that the issues raised here will contribute
to the debate over any new regulations that he Department of Education may adopt.
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I. The Dear Colleague Letter
A. An Illustrative Case
It will be helpful to give readers a sense of what campus Title IX
adjudications can look like in the real world.
The following facts are from Doe v. Brandeis University,16 decided in
March of 2016. In Brandeis," a male student had been found guilty of
repeated acts of "sexual violence" against another male student during their
twenty-one-month relationship,' including multiple incidents in which the
plaintiff "would occasionally wake [the complainant] up by kissing him," as
well as an attempt to perform oral sex at a time when the complainant "did
not want it." 1 9
The plaintiff in Brandeis had not been expelled or suspended, but a
permanent sex offense notation had been entered onto his academic record,
which, he claimed, would adversely affect his future educational and
employment opportunities.20 According to the plaintiff, confidentiality had
also been breached, and other students had referred to him "as an 'attacker'
and a 'rapist' in social media postings and in comments to national and local
media."2 1
What procedures had Brandeis followed to judge the plaintiff guilty of
sexual violence? In the words of the district court, the university had used:
essentially a secret and inquisitorial process. Among other things,
under the new procedure,
* the accused was not entitled to know the details of the
charges;
* the accused was not entitled to see the evidence;
* the accused was not entitled to counsel;
* the accused was not entitled to confront and cross-examine
the accuser;
* the accused was not entitled to cross-examine any other
witnesses;
* the Special Examiner prepared a detailed report, which the
accused was not permitted to see until the entire process had
concluded; and
16. 177 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mass. 2016).
17. I use defendant names to identify cases because of the multiplicity of "Doe" plaintiffs.
18. Brandeis, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 567, 570-71.
19. Id. at 571.
20. Id. at 571-72.
21. Id. at 572.
18 [Vol. 96:15
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* the Special Examiner's decision as to the "responsibility"
(that is, guilt) of the accused was essentially final, with
limited appellate review-among other things, the decision
could not be overturned on the ground that it was incorrect,
unfair, arbitrary, or unsupported by the evidence.2 2
This inquisitorial procedure was new to Brandeis. The school had
adopted it in 2012, after receiving a communication from the Department of
Education-the Dear Colleague letter referred to above.23 The new process
applied only to sex offenses.24 For other alleged offenses, Brandeis still
provided students with notice and a hearing, as it used to.25
The "Special Examiner" mentioned by the judge was the individual
hired by Brandeis to investigate the complainant's allegations: "That same
person was given complete authority to decide whether the accused was
'responsible' for the alleged violations; in other words, the Special Examiner
was simultaneously the investigator, the prosecutor, and the judge who
determined guilt." 26 To reach the conclusion that kissing-while-asleep
constituted sexual violence, the Special Examiner "use[d] the definition of
sexual violence provided by the U.S. Department of Education, Office for
Civil Rights in its April 4, 2011 Dear Colleague letter."27
Many schools, after receiving the Dear Colleague letter, adopted similar
inquisitorial processes-approvingly referred to by a White House task force
in 2014 as the "innovative" "'single investigator' model," which can "bolster
trust in the process."2 8 Moreover, kissing a sleeping longtime partner would
meet the new affirmative-consent definitions of sexual assault now in place
at schools all over the country-sometimes forced on them by state statute.29
22. Id. at 570.
23. Id. at 575, 577-78.
24. Id. at 577.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 579.
27. Id. at 588, 591 (quoting the Special Examiner's Report).
28. WHITE HOUSE, NOT ALONE: THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO
PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT 14 (2014) [hereinafter NOT ALONE: THE FIRST
REPORT], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/report 0.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8HX
-Y6HY]; see also, e.g., Prasad v. Cornell Univ., No. 5:15-cv-322, 2016 WL 3212079, at *10-12,
*22-23 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016) (describing the "investigator model" procedure used at Cornell);
Justin Dillon & Matt Kaiser, Why It's Unfair for Colleges to Use Outside Investigators in Rape
Cases, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0916-dillon-
kaiser-campus-sex-assault-javert-20150916-story.htmil [http://perma.cc/JLL7-BSYF] ("[A]
growing number of schools, including Harvard, Dartmouth, the University of Michigan and Boston
College, are turning to the 'single investigator' model . . . .").
29. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(4)(A) (West 2017) (requiring schools, as a funding
condition, in their definition of sexual assault, to provide that a person's belief that the other party
has consented to any "sexual activity" is invalid if the "complainant was asleep"); Jed Rubenfeld,
The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1386




Nevertheless, the Brandeis facts are not offered as typical.30 Brandeis simply
illustrates what can happen when the federal government threatens schools
with defunding unless they adjudicate all sexual assault allegations, induces
them to define sexual assault broadly, pressures them to take strong action in
such cases, tells them that Title IX does not require a hearing, and instructs
them that they need not honor due process for the accused.31
The Brandeis court refused to dismiss plaintiffs suit, finding that
plaintiff might succeed on a variety of contract and state law claims. But as
to the most palpable violation-the constitutional due process violation-the
court observed that due process applies only to state actors, and "Brandeis,
of course, is not a governmental entity, or even a public university."32
B. The Letter
On April 4, 2011, the United States Department of Education's Office
for Civil Rights (OCR) sent a nineteen-page letter to American colleges and
universities.33 Opening with the government-standard but peculiar salutation,
"Dear Colleague"-as if the sender were a fellow academic, or, since that
was not so, as if academics were fellow federal administrative agents-the
letter set forth a new interpretation of what Title IX requires with respect to
allegations of sexual assault on campus.34
By its terms, Title IX prohibits sexual discrimination at schools
receiving federal funds.35 By judicial interpretation, it prohibits "sexual
harassment" that creates a "hostile environment" significantly interfering
with educational opportunities.36 As to allegations of sexual assault, however,
Title IX had previously been interpreted not to require schools to conduct
their own internal adjudications. In 2005, OCR expressly stated that a school
"was under no obligation to conduct an independent investigation" in cases
involving "a possible violation of the penal law, the determination of which
is the exclusive province of the police and the office of the district attorney."37
30. Schools vary considerably in their Title IX adjudication processes. See infra Section
IV(B)(2).
31. See infra Section (I)(B).
32. Brandeis, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 572.
33. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE: SEXUAL VIOLENCE
1 (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/LA6D-KHYG].
34. See id. at 1-3 (explaining "specific Title IX requirements applicable to sexual violence" and
providing "guidance and practical examples").
35. Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972 § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
36. See, e.g., Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 65 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Brown
v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying to a Title IX case the hostile
environment concept from Title VII case law).
37. Letter from John F. Carroll, Compliance Team Leader, Region II, Office for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Muriel A. Howard, President, Buffalo State Coll., State Univ. of N.Y., Re:
20 [Vol. 96:15
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Whether academic institutions should hold trials for serious alleged
student crimes, without involving law enforcement, is a substantial question.
If an apparent murder took place at a fraternity house, it would be extremely
rare for a school to conduct its own murder trial and unheard-of to fail to
bring in the police.38 Rape, however, might be thought to require very
different policies because of victims' reluctance to report the crime.39 Citing
this underreporting problem, the Dear Colleague letter reversed prior agency
interpretations of Title IX-even though the letter purported only to be
restating, not changing, the law-and directed schools to investigate and
adjudicate every case of alleged sexual violence.40
The legal theory set out by the Dear Colleague letter is simple. "Sexual
violence is a form of sexual harassment prohibited by Title IX," 4 1 the letter
reasons, and a "single instance" of student-on-student sexual violence can be
sufficient to "create a hostile environment."42 The letter went on to detail
institutional, substantive, and procedural requirements for receiving,
charging, investigating, and adjudicating sexual assault allegations.43 Schools
that did not comply would be subject to monetary penalties, including the
loss of federal funding.44
According to the Dear Colleague letter, as well as later statements and
directives issued by the government, schools were:
Case No. 02-05-2008 (Aug. 30, 2005) (on file with author); see also Jacob E. Gersen & Jeannie
Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REv. 881, 901 (2016) (citing this OCR letter).
38. See, e.g., Kathryn Andreoli, Clemson Student Charged with Attempted Murder After
Stabbing at Party, WYFF 4 (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.wyff4.com/article/clemson-student-
charged-with-attempted-murder-after-stabbing-at-party/7021329 [http://perma.cc/7S3P-SJB6]
(recounting police involvement in the investigation of an on-campus stabbing). Of course, schools
can also discipline students in such cases. See Press Release, Mitchel B. Wallerstein, President,
Baruch Coll., Baruch Response to Criminal Charges in Pi Delta Psi Hazing Investigation (Sept. 15,
2015), https://www.baruch.cuny.edu/president/messages/September_15_2015.htm [ ttps://perma
.cc/577B-WMCC] (stating that Baruch College had initiated disciplinary proceedings against
students involved in a fraternity death). Note, however, that the disciplinary charges brought by
Baruch were possibly for hazing, not homicide, and that the police were actively pursuing a murder
investigation. Id.
39. See CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CAMPUS SEXUAL
ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY xvii (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/221153.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CGW-434B] (stating that only 13% of claimed campus sexual assault victims
said they had reported the incident to a law enforcement agency); see also Eliza Gray, Why Victims
of Rape in College Don't Report to the Police, TIME (June 23, 2014), http://time.com/2905637/
campus-rape-assault-prosecution/ [https://perma.cc/PVE7-K6DF] ("For [victim] advocates, doing
right by the victim often means respecting her or his wishes not to report the crime to the police and
even telling the victim about the possible downsides of the criminal justice system .... ").
40. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 33, at 8-12 (explaining the grievance
procedures required for conformity with OCR guidance).
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 8-12.
44. Id. at 16.
212017]
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(i) required to investigate and adjudicate campus sexual assault
allegations regardless of whether the complainant reported
his or her allegations to the police;45
(ii) required to establish a coordinated and centralized
investigative and prosecutorial process overseen by a Title IX
"coordinator";46
(iii) required to protect the anonymity of complainants if the
student making the allegations so requested;47
(iv) required to investigate and adjudicate in all cases where the
school knew or had reason to know of a "possible" incident
of sexual assault, regardless of whether the alleged victim had
filed a complaint;48
(v) required to investigate and adjudicate student-on-student
claims of sexual assault regardless of whether the assault
allegedly occurred on campus or off; 49
(vi) required to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard in
all such cases;o
(vii) required to revise their disciplinary codes to reflect the
OCR's interpretation of Title IX requirements, including
prohibiting all "unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature";5 1
45. See id. at 10 ("[A] criminal investigation into allegations of sexual violence does not relieve
the school of its duty under Title IX to resolve complaints promptly and equitably.").
46. See id at 7 ("The coordinator's responsibilities include overseeing all Title IX complaints
and identifying and addressing any patterns or systemic problems that arise during the review of
such complaints.").
47. Id. at 5 ("If the complainant requests confidentiality or asks that the complaint not be
pursued, the school should take all reasonable steps to investigate and respond to the complaint
consistent with the request for confidentiality or request not to pursue an investigation."). How
schools are supposed to "take all reasonable steps to investigate . . . consistent with . .. [a] request
not to pursue an investigation" is not explained. Id.
48. Id. at 4 ("Regardless of whether a harassed student, his or her parent, or a third party files a
complaint under the school's grievance procedures or otherwise requests action on the student's
behalf, a school that knows, or reasonably should know, about possible harassment must promptly
investigate to determine what occurred . . . .").
49. Id. ("If a student files a complaint with the school, regardless of where the conduct occurred,
the school must process the complaint in accordance with its established procedures.").
50. Id. at 11 ("[I]n order for a school's grievance procedures to be consistent with Title IX
standards, the school must use a preponderance of the evidence standard (i.e., it is more likely than
not that sexual harassment or violence occurred).").
51. Id. at 6 (requiring recipients of the Dear Colleague letter to examine "current policies and
procedures on sexual harassment and sexual violence" and to conform those policies to the
requirements of the letter); id. at 3 (defining "sexual harassment" as "unwelcome conduct of a sexual
nature"). The OCR has explicitly instructed schools that they must prohibit all such conduct, not
merely harassment sufficient to create a hostile environment (which is necessary to violate Title IX).
See Letter from Anurima Bhargava, Chief, Civil Rights Div., Educ. Opportunities Section, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, & Gary Jackson, Reg'1 Dir., Office of Civil Rights, Seattle Office, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., to Royce Engstrom, President, Univ. of Mont., & Lucy France, Univ. Counsel, Univ. of
22 [Vol. 96:15
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(viii) instructed that sexual assault includes all unconsented-to
sexual activity; 52
(ix) warned not to permit cross-examination of the complainant;53
and
(x) warned that they must at least consider expulsion of students
found to have committed sexual misconduct and that they can
be placed under investigation if they fail to suspend or expel
such students.54
With respect to due process, the Dear Colleague letter says that "public"
schools (not private ones) "must provide due process to the alleged
perpetrator."" However, "schools should ensure that steps taken to accord
due process rights to the alleged perpetrator do not restrict ... Title IX
protections for the complainant."56
The latter sentence is troubling. Given the Constitution's priority over
statutory law, one might have expected the opposite admonition: "Schools
Mont. 8 (May 9, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opallegacy/2013/05/09/um-Itr-
fmdings.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XVN-6J6X] ("While [the University of Montana's definition of
sexual harassment] is consistent with a hostile educational environment created by sexual
harassment, sexual harassment should be more broadly defined as 'any unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature."').
52. The definitions of sex offenses imposed by the federal government on schools are complex
and various. For the most careful discussion, see Gersen & Suk, supra note 37, at 892-95. The
Department of Education has defined sexual assault to include penetration or any other "sexual act"
"without the consent of the victim," "including instances where the victim is incapable of giving
consent." Id. at 893 (quoting federal regulations). It's a short step from this definition of sexual
assault to the conclusion that kissing one's sleeping partner is sexual assault.
53. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 31 (Apr. 29, 2014) [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
TITLE IX], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YWT3-HA7C] (discouraging a school from "allowing the parties to personally question or cross-
examine each other"); NOT ALONE: THE FIRST REPORT, supra note 28, at 19 ("[T]he parties should
not be allowed to personally cross-examine each other.").
54. See Letter from Alice B. Wender, Reg'1 Office Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't
Educ., to Teresa A. Sullivan, President, Univ. of Va. 21 (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www2.ed.gov/
documents/press-releases/university-virginia-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/F27S-CD6M] (noting that
UVA's refusal to "consider expulsion as a possible sanction where a finding of sexual misconduct
is based on a preponderance of evidence standard or even when there is no question as to the accused
student's culpability because he or she has admitted to the conduct," provided "an additional basis
for the existence of a hostile environment"); Jake New, Expulsion Presumed, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(June 27, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/06/27/should-expulsion-be-default-
discipline-policy-students-accused-sexual-assault [ht ps://perma.cc/DAZ5-SUUK] ("Several of the
colleges currently under investigation by the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights for
Title IX violations are on that list because they allowed accused students to remain on campus with
their alleged victims.").
55. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 33, at 12. The letter also says that "state-supported
schools" must protect due process, but "state-supported" does not refer to private colleges or
universities. Id.; see, e.g., Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 462-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting
the letter and rejecting a student's due process claim against a private college).
56. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 33, at 12.
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should ensure that steps taken to accord Title IX protections for the
complainant do not restrict the due process rights of the accused." By
reversing this formulation, the Dear Colleague letter went beyond telling
private schools they weren't obliged to respect due process; it warned them
that trying to honor due process might violate Title IX.
In a follow-up communication, OCR emphasized that Title IX does not
even "require a hearing."57 Thus, private schools that choose to hold hearings
and vindicate traditional due process values do so at their peril, and it's no
surprise that some universities, like Brandeis, have responded by adopting
the hearing-less single investigator model described above.
The amounts of money potentially involved in the threatened defunding
deserve emphasis. The federal government spent an estimated $75.6 billion
on major higher education programs in 2013, including Pell Grants, research
grants, and other appropriations." Colleges that don't comply with OCR
directives risk their entire slice of this amount.59 That can translate to
57. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX, supra note 53, at 25.
58. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDING OF HIGHER EDUCATION: A
CHANGING LANDSCAPE 3 (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/
2015/06/federal-and-state-funding-of-higher-education [https://perma.cc/6V6K-QHNW].
59. DOE implied that noncompliance with OCR directives threatened all of a school's federal
funding. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ. Press Office, U.S. Department of Education
Finds Tufts University in Massachusetts in Violation of Title IX for Its Handling of Sexual Assault
and Harassment Complaints (Apr. 28, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Educ.],
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-finds-tufts-university-
massachusetts-violation-title-ix-its-handling-sexual-assault-and-harassment-complaints
[https://perma.cc/TXM6-SZLT] (threatening to "move to initiate proceedings to terminate federal
funding" of an allegedly noncompliant school). DOE's former Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights
Catherine Lhamon made public statements suggesting that OCR could bring about a total
termination of a school's federal funds. See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, Senators Eye New Penalties for
Colleges Mishandling Sexual Assault Cases, HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/27/colleges-mishandling-sexual-assault-penalties-n
5535458.html [https://perma.cc/CE3S-L4AV] (reporting on a Senate hearing at which several
Senators described the possibility that universities could be "cut off from all federal funding" by
OCR as a "nuclear option," to which Lhamon responded by calling it a "good nuclear option").
Nonetheless, it wasn't clear that OCR or DOE could have achieved this result. Title IX defunding
can apply to all federal funds, but each agency is responsible for its own termination procedures.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012) (authorizing federal departments and agencies to effect compliance by
terminating or refusing assistance but limiting termination or refusal to particular programs or parts
of programs in which noncompliance is found). It would seem, then, that DOE could terminate only
DOE-administered funds such as Pell Grants-which, however, at over $30 billion, made up more
than 40% of all 2013 federal higher educational funding. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note
58, at 3 fig. 2. But other federal agencies have announced that they intend to "work with" DOE to
"terminate funding to any institution found to be in noncompliance with Title IX ..... Press
Release, Nat'l Sci. Found., The National Science Foundation (NSF) Will Not Tolerate Sexual
Harassment at Grantee Institutions (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.nsf.gov/news/newssunmm
.jsp?cntn-id=137466 [https://perma.cc/CZT9-MAFV]; see also Press Release, Nat'l Aeronautics
and Space Admin., NASA Administrator Communicates Harassment Policies to Grantees (Jan. 15,
2016), https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-administrator-communicates-harassment-policies-
to-grantees [https://perma.cc/RE3D-TSFX] (stating that NASA will "work closely" with OCR to
ensure that no funds are given to entities violating Title IX). Hence, a DOE or OCR finding of a
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hundreds of millions of dollars per school, representing in some cases 1 5 0 -
20% of a school's overall operating revenue.60
Was the defunding threat serious? The government certainly tried to
make schools believe so. Since 2011, over 200 schools have been placed
under formal investigation by the Department of Education6 1 and warned that
they could "lose federal funding" if they fail to punish sexual assault
assiduously or to comply with OCR directives.62 In 2014, the head of OCR,
Catherine Lhamon, stated she had personally threatened four schools in the
last ten months with termination of federal funding.63 "Do not think it's an
empty threat," she said.64
By now schools all over the country have overhauled their disciplinary
codes and processes to comply with the Dear Colleague letter's mandates.65
Those that resisted were brought quickly into line. Events at Tufts University
provide an example. After Tufts's president disputed OCR's finding that the
university was in violation of Title IX and (very unusually) refused to agree
to a list of OCR directives, the Department of Education published a
statement warning that "OCR may move to initiate proceedings to terminate
federal funding of Tufts."6 6 Within ten days, Tufts had reversed itself and
agreed to the terms OCR had sought.67 As described in the Boston Globe, the
university-wide Title IX violation could in theory result in termination of most or all federal funding.
The author thanks Professor Kate Stith for emphasizing the issues addressed in this footnote.
60. For example, Yale University's federal funding exceeded $500 million in 2010 out of a total
$2.72 billion of operating revenue (or roughly 18%). YALE UNIV., FINANCIAL REPORT 2009-2010,
at 1 (2010), https://your.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2009-2010_annualfinancial-report_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J898-2PGW]. The University of Illinois's was around $600 million out of a total
$3.56 billion (or roughly 17%). UNIV. OF IL., ANNUAL FINANcIAL REPORT 2015, at 11 (2015),
https://www.obfs.uillinois.edu/common/pages/DisplayFile.aspx?itemId=391901 [https://perma.cc/
EM7Y-EKDX]. The University of Virginia's was about $200 million in 2015 out of a total $938
million (or roughly 21%). UNIV. OF VA., FINANCIAL REPORT 2014-2015, at 14 (2015)
http://www.virginia.edu/finance/finanalysis/docs/2015%20UVA%20FS%2OFINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3KZV-Y6GJ].
61. See Title IX Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., http://projects
.chronicle.com/titleix/ [https://perma.cc/3TFD-PQGZ] (listing schools that have been and are being
investigated, including schools that are the subject of multiple investigations).
62. Press Release, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., U.S. Department of Education
Releases List of Higher Education Institutions with Open Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations
(May 1, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-
higber-education-institutions-open-title-ix-sexual-violence-investigations [https://perma.cc/5RXZ-
ETJY].
63. Tyler Kingkade, Colleges Warned They Will Lose Federal Funding for Botching Campus
Rape Cases, HUFFINGTON POST (July 14, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/14
/funding-campus-rape-dartmouth-summit n_5585654.html [https://perma.cc/3FFX-GQFW].
64. Id.
65. Gersen & Suk, supra note 37, at 902.
66. U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 59.
67. Letter from Tony Monaco, President, Tufts Univ., to Members of the Tufts Community,
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threatened defunding would have been "a result so catastrophic that it
virtually required Tufts to reach some understanding with the government. "68
C. State Action Rulings
The new Title IX sexual assault adjudications quickly began provoking
outcry and litigation. Some students who say they were sexual assault victims
have alleged that their claims were mishandled, their hearings biased, and
their assailants falsely exonerated or inadequately punished.6 9 Other students,
found guilty of sexual assault, have alleged that the findings against them
were false, unfairly reached, and biased."
In the latter lawsuits, plaintiffs have sometimes filed constitutional due
process claims against their schools. In cases where the defendant was a
private college or university, every court to have reached the issue thus far
has dismissed these claims for lack of state action." A one-sentence rejection
is typical. For example:
As an initial matter, to the extent that Yu is claiming that Vassar's
disciplinary proceedings denied him constitutional due process, this
argument is without merit. Since Vassar is a private college, and not a
68. Marcella Bombardieri, Tufts Accepts Finding It Violated Law in Sex Assaults, Bos. GLOBE
(May 9, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/05/09/reversal-tufts-accepts-finding-that-
violated-title-sexual-assault-cases/AljGY7mlMlgZRXmPIgslxI/story.html
[https://perma.cc/3DTG-MGRM].
69. Emma Sulkowicz's "Carry That Weight" project at Columbia University is one of the most
highly publicized of these protests. For an account, see Ariel Kaminer, Accusers and the Accused,
Crossing Paths at Columbia University, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/12/22/nyregion/accusers-and-the-accused-crossing-paths-at-columbia.html [ tps://perma.cc/
3NE9-PT5T].
70. See, e.g., Max Kutner, The Other Side of the College Sexual Assault Crisis, NEWSWEEK
(Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/18/other-side-sexual-assault-crisis-403285
.html [https://perma.cc/U89Q-F98G]; Student Sues Georgia Tech After Expulsion for Sexual
Misconduct, USA TODAY (Nov. 27, 2015), http://college.usatoday.com/2015/11/27/expelled-
student-sues-georgia-tech/ [https://perma.cc/43FB-75CL].
71. See, e.g., Tsuruta v. Augustana Univ., No. 4:15-CV-04150-KES, 2015 WL 5838602, at *2
(D.S.D. Oct. 7, 2015) (noting that "[t]he courts that have considered [whether a private school's
compliance with Title IX's complaint-resolution regulations make that entity a state actor] appear
to agree that private colleges are not state actors by virtue of their adoption of Title IX grievance
procedures"); Doe v. Washington & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *8
(W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015) (stating that "[h]ad Plaintiff been enrolled at a public university, he would
have been entitled to due process . . . [but] [u]nfortunately for Plaintiff, [Washington & Lee] is a
private university, and as such, is generally not subject to the constitutional protections of the Fifth
Amendment"); Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 368 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining
that "[t]o the extent [the complaint states a constitutional due process claim] the claims fail, as such
constitutional claims may be brought only against 'state actors' and Columbia is indisputably a
private university"); Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (rejecting due
process argument for lack of requisite state action); Bleiler v. Coll. of Holy Cross, No. CIV.A. 11-
11541-DJC, 2013 WL 4714340, at *4 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2013) (holding that "[s]ince there is no
dispute that Holy Cross is a private school, the federal Constitution does not establish the level of
due process that the College had to give [the plaintiff] in his disciplinary hearing" (citations
omitted)).
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state actor, "the federal Constitution does not establish the level of due
process that [Vassar] had to give [Yu] in his disciplinary
proceeding."72
As mentioned above, this view was also expressed in the Dear Colleague
letter itself.73 This position is apparently so taken for granted that, according
to a lawyer in the Ninth Circuit, one district judge not only dismissed his
constitutional claims against a private college, but threatened him with
Rule 11 sanctions for pleading them.7 4
But as Part II will show, this position is wrong.7 5
II. Why Due Process Applies to Today's Campus Sexual Assault
Hearings
A. A State Action Primer
The Constitution's rights apply almost without exception against
governmental actors, not private actors.6 If you kick people out of your house
because of their political opinions, you're not violating the First Amendment,
because the First Amendment doesn't apply against you. 77 This fundamental
structuring postulate of American constitutional law is called the "state
action" doctrine,7 8 where the word "state" means governmental (not Montana
or Idaho).
Ascertaining the existence of state action is ordinarily unproblematic.
You just look at who the actor was.79 If the challenged action was taken by
official governmental actors-whether legislative, executive, or judicial-
72. Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 462 (footnote omitted) (quoting Bleiler, 2013 WL 4714340, at *4).
73. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
74. Confidential communication on file with author (Oct. 19, 2015).
75. As this Article was being edited for publication, the Department of Education announced
the withdrawal of the Dear Colleague letter and a plan to replace it with as-yet unspecified
regulations to be issued through a notice-and-comment process. See supra note 15. If, as this Article
argues, private (as well as public) schools have repeatedly violated the due process rights of students
found guilty of sexual assault under procedures adopted as a result of the Dear Colleague letter,
those rights should of course be vindicated notwithstanding the withdrawal of the letter. In addition,
many schools will probably leave in place their recently adopted procedures until the new
regulations are enacted; students tried under these procedures may also have due process claims that
deserve to be vindicated.
76. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) ("[T]he conduct
of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most instances .... ).
77. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982) ("[I]t is fundamental that the
First Amendment prohibits governmental infringement on the right of free speech." (emphasis
added)).
78. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("As a matter of
substantive constitutional law the state-action requirement reflects judicial recognition of the fact
that 'most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by
governments."' (quoting Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978))).




the state action requirement is satisfied" and ordinarily won't be mentioned.
If not, constitutional restraints don't apply.
Occasionally, however, acts taken by nongovernmental parties are
deemed state action for constitutional purposes. Speaking very generally,
such cases fall into two categories.
In the first, the private party becomes a state actor because governmental
authorities have involved or "entwined" themselves with that party in some
unusual fashion-as, for example, by renting space in a public building to a
privately owned coffee shop open only to whites, and profiting from its
revenues." There is no single test for this branch of the doctrine. What the
Supreme Court has made clear, however, is that certain relationships between
government and private parties are not sufficient. For example, being a
government contractor is insufficient.82 Receiving almost all of one's revenue
from the government is not sufficient.83 Nor is the fact of being highly
regulated.84 Private utility companies are as highly regulated as any
commercial entity could be, and often under contract with governments, yet
the Court has consistently held that they are not state actors.85
In the second category, private parties can become state actors because
of the nature of the activity they are engaged in, without involvement by
80. See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879) ("It is doubtless true that a State may act
through different agencies-either by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities; and the
prohibitions of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment extend to all action of the State ... whether it be
action by one of these agencies or by another."); see also, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 179 (1972) ("State action ... may emanate from rulings of administrative and regulatory
agencies as well as from legislative or judicial action.").
81. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716, 726 (1961); see also Brentwood
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295, 298 (2001) (holding an ostensibly
private association to be a state actor because of the "pervasive entwinement of public institutions
and public officials in its composition and workings"); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)
("Conduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies ... as to
become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action.").
82. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841 ("Acts of... private contractors do not become acts of
the government by reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing public
contracts."). By contrast, government employees are generally state actors. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 49 (1988).
83. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41 (explaining that "private corporations whose
business depends primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the
government" do not constitute as state actors).
84. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) ("[T]he mere fact that a
business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State . . ..
(quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974)).
85. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350, 358 (1974) (holding that a utility company "subject to
extensive state regulation" did not constitute a state actor).
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government officials.86 In this "public function"8 7 branch of the doctrine, case
law does establish a governing test. An activity is a public function only if it
has been "traditionally" "exclusively" performed by the state." This test is
extremely hard to meet. As the Court has put it, "[w]hile many functions have
been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been
'exclusively reserved to the State.""'
This short state action primer should indicate why a city's privatized,
contract-police force would seemingly not be a state actor under current
doctrine. Its status as a government contractor would fail to suffice. Even if
it received most of its revenue from the state and was regulated to some
degree, there would be no state action under current "entwinement" doctrine.
And according to the best article written on the topic, "no aspect of policing,
neither patrol nor detection, has ever been 'exclusively' performed by the
government, and all have at one point or another been left largely to private
initiative.""o
That statement may be a slight exaggeration,91 but most police
activities-patrolling the streets, investigating crimes, intervening physically
in crimes, even making arrests-have undoubtedly been done by private
citizens in the Anglo-American tradition for centuries.92 Citizens' arrests
86. See, e.g., id. at 352; see also G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action
Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 Hous. L. REV. 333, 344-46 (1997)
(discussing situations in which a private entity engages in activity "so predominantly, even
uniquely, governmental in nature that the private actor's action may be fairly attributable to
government").
87. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 302-03
(2001) (discussing application of the "public function test").
88. See id. at 302 ("[T]he performance of ... a public function did not permit a finding of state
action ... unless the function performed was exclusively and traditionally public .... ); Rendell-
Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (1982) ("[T]he question is whether the function performed has been
'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State."' (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353)); Jackson,
419 U.S. at 352 ("[S]tate action [is] present in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State.").
89. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978). To give a simple illustration: the
Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps, created by contract with the city of Blooming Grove,
New York, to provide emergency ambulance and medical services to that community, is not a state
actor because (1) the contractor relationship fails to suffice under entanglement doctrine, and
(2) "ambulance services in this country historically were provided by an array of non-state actors,
including hospitals, private ambulance services, and, in what seems to be somewhat of a conflict of
interest, funeral homes." Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 768 F.3d 259,
262, 265 (2d Cir. 2014).
90. Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1259.
91. Sklansky acknowledges that private police cannot always legally perform all the functions
of public law enforcement-for example, searching private homes for evidence of illegal activity.
See id. at 1183 (observing that tort and criminal doctrines limit the actions of private police).
92. See id. at 1193-221 (providing a historical survey of public and private policing in Europe
and the United States); Stephen Rushin, The Regulation ofPrivate Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159,
176 (2012) (surveying the growing number of state statutes that "formally recognize and protect a
private police officer's ability to engage in coercive behavior" such as "arrest, search, surveillance
and interrogation").
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remain permissible in some form in every state today,93 and they are not
deemed state action when they occur.94 Private police officers have often
been found not to be state actors under public function doctrine, including in
cases where the private officer stopped, searched, and detained suspected
criminals.95  Thus, policing has by no means been an "exclusively"
governmental affair, and a city that privatized its police would arguably
become a Fourth Amendment-free zone.96
The case of military contractors is more complicated, although even
here arguments can be made under current doctrine that no state action exists.
Private military contractors are, after all, contractors (and therefore arguably
not state actors under "entwinement" doctrine), while the longtime existence
of mercenary forces and private militias9 7 might suggest that soldiering is not
a public function either. Hence the uncertainty surrounding this question
too.98
93. See Rushin, supra note 92, at 177 ("Over the last twenty-five years, states have increasingly
moved to codify the common law citizen's arrest doctrine. In 1976, thirty-two states had codified
some . . . right to citizen's arrest. By 2011, all fifty states had . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113, 120 (D.C. 1980) ("The fact that a private
person makes a citizen's arrest does not automatically transform [him] into an agent of the state.
His conduct is not actionable for any deprivation ... of rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution.").
95. See, e.g., United States v. Bowers, 739 F.2d 1050, 1056 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
private detective interviewing a suspect was not required to give Miranda warnings); White v.
Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that store employees who detained and
searched a suspected shoplifter were not performing a public function because "[w]hile these actions
are usually performed by police officers, private citizens do occasionally engage in them"); United
States v. Casteel, 476 F.2d 152, 154 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that private citizens interviewing a
suspect were not required to give Miranda warnings). But see Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130,
135 (1964) (finding an ostensibly private police officer to be a state actor but noting entanglement
with state authority-the private officer was a deputized county sheriff who identified himself as
such during the events in question); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox ofPrivate Policing, 95 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 99-101 (2004) (discussing Griffin).
96. See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1183 ("Criminal procedure law-the vast set of interrelated
constitutional doctrines that regulate ... police officers throughout the United States-has almost
nothing to say about ... private security guards.... Private searches fall outside the coverage of
the Fourth Amendment, and evidence they uncover is almost always admissible .... ).
97. See generally SEAN MCFATE, THE MODERN MERCENARY: PRIVATE ARMIES AND WHAT
THEY MEAN FOR WORLD ORDER (2014) (discussing private war making past and present).
98. See supra note 4; Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs
and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 135, 188
(2005) (arguing that "under even the narrow construction of the state action doctrine found in U.S.
constitutional law,... the activities at Abu Ghraib would probably be actionable" but that "[i]f the
prison were managed entirely by private contractors, showing a nexus to the state would be more
difficult"); Craig S. Jordan, Who Will Guard the Guards? The Accountability ofPrivate Military
Contractors in Areas ofArmed Conflict, 35 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 309,316
(2009) (arguing that "it is ... unlikely that the U.S. would recognize a PMC as acting on behalf of
the state" and that "[c]ourts have been reluctant to find PMCs liable under this doctrine"). But see
Dobyns v. E-Systems, Inc., 667 F.2d 1219, 1225-26 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding a military surveillance
contractor assisting in peacekeeping in the Middle East a state actor on the ground that "military
surveillance" and "peacekeeping" were public functions).
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I will return to the problem of privatization later. While there are deep
uncertainties and inadequacies in current state action doctrine, there's at least
one clear principle that the doctrine gets right, and this principle by itself is
enough to demonstrate state action in the post-2011 Title IX trials conducted
by private schools all over the country.
B. The Blum Principle
If a private citizen were compelled by governmental actors to search his
neighbor's house for evidence of a crime, the search would have to qualify
as state action. Otherwise, the police could easily evade the Fourth
Amendment's restraints, and Congress could circumvent every constitutional
right through the simple expedient of passing a statute requiring private
individuals to engage in otherwise-unconstitutional acts.
For this reason, a coercion or compulsion principle is central to state
action jurisprudence. This principle has long been recognized: as the
Supreme Court puts it, a private party becomes a state actor if the government
"has exercised coercive power" over him.99
The coercion principle is most commonly associated with Blum v.
Yaretsky,1" the 1982 case just quoted, but it dates back at least to the sit-in
cases of the early 1960s. In Petersen v. City of Greenville,"o' the Court found
state action in a racially segregated lunch counter because a city ordinance
required such segregation.102 "When the State has commanded a particular
result, it has saved to itself the power to determine that result ... and, in fact,
has removed that decision from the sphere of private choice."103 In a
companion case, Lombard v. Louisiana,104 the Court reached the same
conclusion where the mayor of New Orleans had issued a public statement
that, as interpreted by the Court, prohibited "desegregated service in
restaurants.""0 ' This official statement, said the Court, had "at least as much
coercive effect as an ordinance"10 6 and therefore required the same state
action conclusion.
As the Court would later affirm in Blum, mere governmental "approval
of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient."0 ' But
where the challenged activity resulted from the state's "exercise[] [of]
coercive power," state action exists.0 s Indeed, in Blum and later cases, the
99. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
100. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
101. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
102. Id. at 250-51.
103. Id. at 248.
104. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
105. Id. at 268, 273.
106. Id.




Court has gone much further: even if not coerced, a private party's conduct
is state action if government has "provided such significant encouragement,
either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
State."'09
The Blum principle leaves little doubt about the existence of state action
in the sexual assault investigations and adjudications conducted under the
Dear Colleague letter's mandate. If "overt," "significant encouragement"
means anything, it includes conditioning hundreds of millions of dollars in
federal funds on an institution's compliance with governmental directives.
But the Dear Colleague letter did not merely encourage. It almost certainly
coerced.
To be sure, it's possible to argue that conditional-funding regimes never
coerce because the funding recipient is always free to walk away from the
funds. But it's well established that in unusual circumstances, a threat to strip
funding can be coercive, operating as a "gun to the head."' And in the case
most nearly on point, not only did a court find coercion-the federal
government conceded it.
A decade ago, Congress threatened to defund universities if any of their
departments denied on-campus access to recruiters from the U.S. military
(which, at that time, excluded openly gay individuals)."' In a suit challenging
this regulation brought by professors at Yale Law School, the Department of
Defense conceded that this defunding threat was coercive, and the court so
ruled:
DoD has conceded the fact of coercion... . There is no question of
fact that the Faculty, acting as Yale Law School, voted to [permit on-
campus access to military recruiters] because of the threatened cut-off
of $300 million to other parts of Yale University. This court
concludes, as a matter of law, that this conceded coercion is well past
the point of pressure and is compulsion."12
109. Id.; see also, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989) (finding
state action in private employers' breath and urine testing of employees where the federal
government had enacted nonmandatory regulations "ma[king] plain not only its strong preference
for testing, but also its desire to share the fruits of such intrusions").
110. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (opinion of Roberts,
C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); see also, e.g., Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y
Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013) (stating that funding conditions can be found unconstitutional
"when the condition is actually coercive, in the sense of an offer that cannot be refused"); Planned
Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. Hodges, 188 F. Supp. 3d 684, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (same); Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d 138, 152 (D.D.C. 2001) (stating
that "acceptance of conditional funding" can be a "coerced decision"), rev'd, 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
111. See Doug Lederman, A Supreme Battle Takes Shape, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Sept. 22, 2005),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/09/22/solomon [https://perma.cc/K759-228V].
112. Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 175 (D. Conn. 2005) (citation omitted), rev'don
other grounds ub nom. Burt v. Gates, 502 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2007). Note: the author of this Article
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Although it involved funding to states, the Court's decision in
Sebelius"'t-the health care case-is also instructive. Seven Justices in
Sebelius held that the federal government's threat to strip states of Medicaid
funding if they refused to participate in the new health care program "crossed
the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion."ll4 These Justices
stressed, among other things, (1) that the defunding threat was based on a
newly imposed condition, meaning that states had not agreed to it when they
had initially accepted (and become reliant on) Medicaid funding;1 s (2) the
threat applied broadly to preexisting funds unrelated to the newly imposed
health-insurance scheme;1 6 and, most importantly, (3) the sheer size of the
funds under threat.117 Federal Medicaid funds, noted the Justices, constituted
over 10% of most states' total revenue and accounted for roughly 22% of
overall state budgets.1" Faced with so massive a loss in funding, states would
have "no real choice" but to participate in the national health care program.1 9
All three of these factors apply to the Title IX context. First, the
conditions imposed by the Dear Colleague letter were new, representing a
dramatic shift from prior agency interpretations of Title IX,120 and therefore
was a party to and lawyer in Burt. The named plaintiff was the late Robert Burt, a devoted colleague
and friend.
113. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
114. Id. at 2603 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) ("[The States] object
that Congress has 'crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion' in the way it has
structured the funding .... Given the nature of the threat and the programs at issue here, we must
agree." (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992)); id at 2662 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("In structuring the ACA, Congress unambiguously
signaled its belief that every State would have no real choice but to go along with the Medicaid
Expansion. If the anticoercion rule does not apply in this case, then there is no such rule.").
115. Id. at 2606 ("[T]hough Congress' power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it
does not include surprising participating States with post-acceptance or 'retroactive' conditions."
(quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981)).
116. Id. at 2603 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("Instead of simply refusing to grant the new funds
to States that will not accept the new conditions, Congress has also threatened to withhold those
States' existing Medicaid funds."); id. at 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan,
JJ.) ("A State could hardly anticipate that Congress's reservation of the right to 'alter' or 'amend'
the Medicaid program included the power to transform it so dramatically."); id. at 2666 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("Congress could have made just the new funding
provided under the ACA contingent on acceptance of the terms of the Medicaid Expansion[,] . . . so
that only new funding was conditioned on new eligibility extensions.").
117. Id. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State's
overall budget ... is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce
in the Medicaid expansion."); id. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("[T]he
sheer size of this federal spending program in relation to state expenditures means that a State would
be very hard pressed to compensate for the loss of federal funds by cutting other spending or raising
additional revenue.").
118. Id. at 2604-05 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito,
JJ., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2608 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
120. See supra Section I(B).
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not what schools had signed up for when initially accepting the funds at issue.
Second, the defunding threat applied to all federal funding across the board,
making the Title IX defunding threat look more like a coercive penalty than
a policy choice about what the government wanted its money spent on.
Finally, and most importantly, the threatened funding loss was massive, both
in absolute terms and as a percentage of operating budgets-in some cases
constituting 15-20% of school budgets.12 '
Because Sebelius involved funding to states, not private entities, the case
is arguably distinguishable, but the three factors just discussed do not merely
state a good argument for coercion under Sebelius. They state a good
argument for coercion, period. Even if styled as mere "guidance," the Dear
Colleague letter, together with the government's investigations of dozens of
universities and repeated reaffirmation of its multi-hundred-million-dollar
defunding threat, was clearly an attempt to force compliance. The letter was
intended to compel, and it was very successful, causing compliance all over
the country, even at schools where there was considerable internal
opposition.122 In a remarkable acknowledgment, Secretary of Education
Betsy DeVos stated in September, 2017, that the Department of Education
and its Office for Civil Rights had been using "intimidation and coercion" to
"push[] schools to overreach."23 It would take an extraordinary feat of
rationalization not to see coercion in the Dear Colleague letter and the
government's enforcement efforts pursuant to it.
Thus Blum leaves scant room for doubt. Under Blum, coercion and even
significant governmental encouragement create state action. At minimum,
121. Yale's federal funding exceeded $500 million in fiscal year 2015, accounting for roughly
16% of operating expenses. YALE UNIV., FINANCIAL REPORT 2014-2015, at 16, 20 (2015),
https://your.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2014-201 5_annualfinancial-reporto.pdf
[https://perma.cc/952Y-6LDW]. Harvard's $578 million accounted for roughly 13% of operating
expenses. HARVARD UNIV., FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 7 (2015),
http://fmance.harvard.edu/files/fad/files/_fyl 5harvard._finreport_.pdf [https://perna.cc/HF2B-
4Y8A]. Tufts's $138 million in federal funding accounted for 17%. TUFTS UNIV., ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT OF TUFTS UNIVERSITY: 2015, at 15 (2015), http://finance.tufts.edu/budgetacc/
files/2015AnnualFinancialReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VJL-F275]. Northwestern's $408.5
million accounted for roughly 20%. NORTHWESTERN UNIV., 2015 FINANCIAL REPORT, at 12, 35
(2015), http://www.northwestern.edu/financial-operations/annual-financial-reports/2015-Financial
-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWB7-4JBZ].
122. As mentioned earlier, OCR's investigation of Tufts provides an illustration. See supra
notes 66-68 and accompanying text. Tufts University President Anthony Monaco, after initially
refusing to comply with OCR directives and denying that his school was in violation of Title IX,
quickly agreed to change the school's policies when OCR warned that it would "move to terminate
Tufts' federal funding if the university did not comply, a result so catastrophic that it virtually
required Tufts to reach some understanding with the government." Bombardieri, supra note 67; see
also, e.g., Opinion, Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard's Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS.
GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014) (publishing statement by twenty-eight Harvard Law School professors
protesting Harvard University's adoption of new policies as a result of the Dear Colleague letter).
Schools may also be reacting to the potentially highly damaging reputational consequences of
OCR's finding them in violation of Title IX-another form of governmental pressure.
123. See DeVos, supra note 15.
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the Dear Colleague letter strongly encouraged, and for many schools all over
the country, it coerced. Far from being Rule 11 sanctionable, the state action
argument here is close to unassailable.124
Which almost puts us in position to turn to the due process merits-to
the question, that is, of whether the procedures used at private colleges'
Title IX sexual assault hearings violate due process. But not quite. Blum
leaves open two crucial questions that have to be answered before proceeding
to the merits.
C. What the Blum Principle Leaves Unanswered
First, a puzzle has always lain buried under the Blum principle-a
problem that, although seemingly obvious, courts almost never confront.
Blum seems to prove far too much.
Blum's "significant encouragement" test would, for example, seem to
make state actors out of every governmental contractor and every recipient
of conditional public spending. Anyone who enters a contract with the
government is given substantial, overt monetary encouragement to do what
the contract requires; anyone who receives conditional benefits is given
substantial encouragement o take the acts that generate the benefits. Why
aren't they all state actors under Blum?
Blum's encouragement est seems, therefore, difficult to take at face
value. Perhaps, then, Blum should be narrowed to coercion-which, in
practice, some lower courts appear to have done by referring to Blum's "state
coercion test,"1 25 a phrase that seems to drop out "encouragement." But the
same puzzle reappears with equal force with respect to coercion.
Government coerces whenever it applies law to us. On April 15, most
adults are legally compelled to file tax returns. Are we state actors when we
124. Not one of the courts finding no state action in private school Title IX hearings, see supra
note 70, genuinely came to grips with Blum. Only two referred to the coercion principle at all, and
they did so cursorily. First, in Tsuruta v. Augustana University, the court acknowledged that
"'extensive regulation' that compels or coerces a private school to act in a given way could
constitute state action." No. 4:15-CV-04150-KES, 2015 WL 5838602, at *2 (D.S.D. Oct. 7, 2015)
(quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982)). However, the Tsuruta court dismissed
the coercion concern, stating only that the plaintiff "has disclosed no cases where a court has found
that a private school's compliance with Title IX's complaint-resolution regulations make that entity
a state actor." Id. Second, in Doe v. Washington & Lee University, the court said that "[w]hile it is
plausible that [the university] was under pressure to convict students accused of sexual assault in
order to demonstrate that the school was in compliance with the OCR's guidance, for Fifth
Amendment protections to apply, '[t]he government must have compelled"' the private actor's
conduct. No. 6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *9 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015) (alteration in
original) (quoting Andrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Atlanta, 998 F.2d 214,218 (4th Cir. 1993)).
The court then went on, with little explanation, to find that the OCR's "guidance" did not amount
to compulsion-perhaps meaning that the school was not compelled to convict, which is not the
issue (the issue being whether the school was compelled to adjudicate). Id
125. E.g., Klunder v. Brown Univ., 778 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2015); see also Paige v. Coyner,
614 F.3d 273, 278 (6th Cir. 2010) (referring to the "state-compulsion test laid out ... in Blum").
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file those returns? Are we state actors when we stop at a red light? When we
refrain from stealing?
The coercion principle implies that private individuals become state
actors whenever they obey the law. It would seem to follow that criminals
are the only truly private actors left in the country-a logical possibility, but
a very odd conclusion. When invoked, the coercion principle is typically
treated as self-evident.12 6 And it is undoubtedly both correct and
indispensable. The puzzle is how to square the correctness of the Blum
principle with the fact of more-or-less ubiquitous governmental coercion at
every moment of our waking lives.
Second, assuming this riddle can be answered, when private schools
adjudicate Title IX sexual assault claims, does the Blum principle imply that
schools are state actors only when they obey the specific procedural rules
mandated by the Dear Colleague Letter, or does it imply that the entirety of
their Title IX adjudicatory process is state action? I'll refer to this as the
"level-of-generality" problem.
To illustrate, recall the inquisitorial Brandeis case described earlier.127
With respect to some particulars of its Title IX process-for example, its
standard of proof-Brandeis was complying with express governmental
directives or warnings.128 But many other pieces of Brandeis's inquisitorial
procedure were filled in by the school at its own discretion. Even then,
however, Brandeis was still engaged in the more general course of action
(adjudicating student-on-student sexual assault claims) that the federal
government had compelled it to take.12 9 The question is whether due process
applies only to the specifically mandated procedural details or instead to all
the procedures Brandeis used to discharge the compelled action. The Blum
principle on its face arguably does not decide this level-of-generality
question.
The level-of-generality question returns us to the privatization "black
hole" with which this Article began. Every privatization case will raise it. Say
that a city disbands its police force and instead contracts with a private
security firm to police its streets. Assume that the contract obliges the firm to
enforce the law and mandates one or two details, but leaves everything else
to the firm's discretion.
126. See, e.g., Andrews, 998 F.2d at 217 (referring to the coercion cases as standing for an
"obvious proposition that when the government orders specific conduct, it must be held accountable
for that conduct").
127. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mass. 2016).
128. See supra Section I(B).
129. See Brandeis, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 572 (noting that the adoption of new procedures by
Brandeis and other universities "has been substantially spurred by the Office for Civil Rights of the
Department of Education, which issued a 'Dear Colleague' letter in 2011 demanding that
universities do so or face a loss of federal funding").
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Why might a city craft its policing contract in this open-ended fashion?
Because doing so would, precisely, help the private security firm evade
constitutional restraints. Gillian Metzger noticed this paradox in state action
doctrine years ago: "Private actors given broader discretion in their exercise
of [delegated] power are less likely to be subject to constitutional constraints
than those who operate under close government supervision and whose
potential for abusive action is thus more curtailed."l30 In just this way, the
Department of Education and OCR, while compelling schools to adjudicate
sexual assault cases, left schools with a large amount of unsupervised
discretion in doing so-which might be said, under existing doctrine, to point
against a state action finding.
Now suppose that the city's newly privatized security firm chooses to
initiate suspicionless stop-and-frisks-a clear Fourth Amendment violation
if conducted by state actors. The same level-of-generality question would be
presented: should constitutional restraints apply only to the particular
mandates imposed by the government, or rather to the entirety of the private
firm's acts of policing? Solving the problem of privatization in constitutional
law depends on answering this question.
Two issues thus remain. First, how do we preserve Blum without turning
everyone into state actors most of the time, and second, which campus sexual
assault trial procedures are properly subject under Blum to due process
analysis-only those specifically mandated by the Dear Colleague letter, or
all the procedures used by a given school, even those not specifically
compelled by the government, when the school was coerced to conduct such
trials by the government?
It turns out that these questions are closely related. Answering them will
require that we recognize a mistake state action doctrine has been making for
a long time. Once we see where current doctrine goes wrong, we will be able
to answer these difficulties, tackle the vast problem that privatization poses
for constitutional law, and, finally, address the due process merits of today's
Title IX sexual assault trials.
III. Where State Action Doctrine Goes Wrong and How To Make It Right
Current state action doctrine begins with the wrong question. Here's the
question state action case law tells judges to answer: Is the actor who took
the challenged action a "state actor"? Because "the party charged" with a
constitutional violation "must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state
actor,""' the "threshold issue" in every state action case is whether the
defendant "is a state actor."'32
130. Metzger, supra note 7, at 1425.
131. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
132. Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 459 F.3d 676, 691-92 (6th
Cir. 2006); see, e.g., MBH Commodity Advisors v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 250 F.3d
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This simple question seems unavoidable, given that constitutional rights
apply only against state actors. And it's a perfectly sensible question to ask
in most cases. It will deliver the right result when defendants are
uncontroversially state actors (legislatures, officials, and so on) and when
defendants are uncontroversially private parties acting without state
involvement. But it's the wrong question to ask in difficult cases.
Specifically, it's the wrong question for every case in which the government
has induced private parties to engage in conduct that would be
unconstitutional if state actors engaged in that conduct directly.
A criminal law analogy is useful. Some crimes can be committed only
by public officials, which is a kind of state actor equirement. Assume New
York prohibits public officials from soliciting bribes. IfA, a New York public
official, induces B, a private citizen, unknowingly to solicit a bribe on A's
behalf from C-where A and C understand what's happening, but B has no
idea-A is guilty of soliciting a bribe even though B is innocent.133 In criminal
law, this kind of case is well known; it's called "perpetration by means."l3 4
Public official A perpetrates the crime by having the innocent B, who
statutorily can't commit it, solicit the bribe for him.
Judges would have no difficulty with such a case under standard
doctrines of criminal law. But if they reasoned the way state action doctrine
reasons, they would have difficulty.
Suppose the judge says to himself, "For this crime to have taken place,
the person soliciting the bribe must have been a public official; thus, the
threshold question is whether B was a public official." The judge might then
correctly observe that B, a private citizen, was not a public official. Suddenly
it begins to look as if no one has committed the crime. B solicited money, but
he wasn't a public official (and didn't even know he was soliciting a bribe),
1052, 1065 n.7 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[The] defendant must be a state actor in order to be subject to the
Constitution's due process requirements." (citing R.J. O'Brien & Assoc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 257,262
(7th Cir. 1995))); Price v. Int'l Union, 927 F.2d 88, 91 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[S]tate action requires:
that ... the party charged with the deprivation must be a state actor."); Jackson v. Urow, No. 86-
3968, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 25988, at *2 (4th Cir. June 10, 1986) ("The person charged with the
wrongful deprivation must be a state actor.").
133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("A
person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when ... acting with the kind of
culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible
person to engage in such conduct. . . ."); see also, e.g., People v. Brody, 83 N.E.2d 676, 678-79
(N.Y. 1949) (upholding defendant's conviction of receiving unauthorized fees as a deputy
commissioner even though the fees had been received by a private intermediary and reasoning that
the "crime of taking unauthorized fees (like the crime of taking bribes .. .) can, obviously, be
committed through an intermediary or agent").
134. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 639 (2000) ("Virtually all legal
systems ... recognize the institution of perpetration-by-means."); see, e.g., United States v. Kelner,
534 F.2d 1020, 1022 (2d Cir. 1976) ("It is a general principle of causation in criminal law that an
individual (with the necessary intent) may be held liable if he is a cause in fact of the criminal
violation, even though the result which the law condemns is achieved through the actions of
innocent intermediaries.").
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so he isn't guilty; A was a public official, but he didn't solicit, so he isn't
guilty either.
The point is this: a violation requiring action by a public official can be
committed by and through a private actor, not because the private actor has
"become a public official," but simply because the public official has induced
the private citizen to commit the violation. In constitutional terms: if state
actors are constitutionally prohibited from invading a certain right, and state
actor A deliberately induces private citizen B to invade that very right, then
A has violated the Constitution-period. The question ofwhether B is himself
a state actor never properly comes into it. 135
Simple though it is, this reorientation of the threshold question points to
the solution of all the difficulties identified at the end of the last section.
First, it completely answers the riddle of Blum's seeming to prove too
much. Yes, if a private individual is coerced by government to search
someone else's house, the search has to comply with the Fourth Amendment.
But that's not because the private individual has become a state actor. It's a
case of perpetration by means. Yes, if a government contract required an
employer to racially discriminate in hiring, the discrimination would be
unconstitutional. The reason is not to be found, however, in excessive
governmental "entwinement" (there would be no more entwinement than in
countless governmental-contractor cases), nor in public function doctrine (no
public function would be at issue). The reason is not that the contractor has
magically transubstantiated into a state actor at all. The true reason is the
Blum principle as just restated: government cannot purposely induce a private
actor to take action that would violate constitutional rights if the government
took the action itself. Thus Blum is correct, but correctly understood, it does
not imply that we all turn into state actors whenever we stop at red lights,
enter into government contracts, file our tax returns, and so on.
At the same time, we can see why Blum was also correct in extending
the coercion principle to cover cases of "significant encouragement." To
repeat the principle just stated:
(1) Inducement principle. Where state actors would violate
constitutional rights by taking a particular action, they cannot
purposely induce a private actor to take that same action.136
Coercion is only one kind of inducement; significant encouragement is
another. That's the lesson of the bribery analogy. Public official A is guilty
135. In criminal cases, difficult proximate-causation issues can arise when the instrumentalized
party is not a wholly innocent agent, but is instead a knowing participant or "semi-innocent."
Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73
CALIF. L. REv. 323, 387 (1985). These complications are not relevant to constitutional law.
136. To be clear, this principle refers to inducing one party to violate another party's
constitutional rights; it does not apply when government merely induces parties to take actions that
the government lacks the power to compel. Congress may pay states to enact a drinking age; it may
offer tax benefits to induce action it has no power to compel.
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of soliciting a bribe provided that he intentionally induced private citizen B
to solicit the bribe on his behalf; it makes no difference whether A coerced B
into this action, offered him money to do it, offered him a position in
government to do it, or offered him any other significant inducement. The
same logic applies to state actors in constitutional law.
Second, we can now pry open the whole problem of privatization in a
new way, which will in turn answer the level-of-generality problem.
Return to the case of a privatized state police department. As we've
seen, current state action doctrine, which looks to the concepts of
entwinement and public function to solve privatization cases, generates a
disturbing answer. Because policing has not traditionally been an exclusive
state preserve, and because a state could contract with a private security firm
and deliberately choose not to supervise that firm closely, a privatized police
force would apparently be a nonstate actor, hence free to violate the Fourth
Amendment at will. To escape that result, the reflexive response of many
critics has been to call for elimination of public function doctrine's
exclusivity requirement, so that many more governmental functions become
public functions.137 A better strategy is to recognize that public function
doctrine too has been asking the wrong question.
Consider these two police forces:
* Google hires a private security firm called Blackwater to police
the Googleplex, the company's multi-acre corporate
headquarters in Mountain View, California; Blackwater
employees patrol, prevent trespass, enforce the criminal law,
and make arrests.
* California replaces all state and local police by entering into a
contract with Blackwater; under this contract, Blackwater
employees, unsupervised by the state, perform functions all
over California identical to those of Google's officers at the
Googleplex.
Public function doctrine tells us that these two cases are to be analyzed
identically. In other words, public function doctrine asks once again whether
the private parties at issue are "state actors," and Blackwater is either a state
actor in both cases or neither. But we don't have to look at the problem this
way.
In case two, Blackwater has to be subject to the Fourth Amendment, or
else the Fourth Amendment will have become a nullity in California. The
same isn't true of Google's security force. The Fourth Amendment is not a
dead letter in California just because it does not apply to purely private
137. See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1259 ("Were the Supreme Court to retract that limitation
[the exclusivity requirement], the difficulty would largely disappear."). Sklansky goes on to discuss
the problems that would follow if the exclusivity requirement were dropped. Id. at 1259-60.
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security officers hired to patrol private property. Public function doctrine
can't see this difference.
Public function doctrine, in current form, asks whether there is a special
set of activities that even private parties can't engage in without
constitutional restraints. But suppose we asked instead the perpetration-by-
means question: is there a special set of activities that government can't
engage in without constitutional restraints, even if it does so through the use
ofprivate parties?
The answer is yes, and law enforcement is the paradigmatic example of
such an activity.
Why? For a simple reason. A host of rights in the Bill of Rights-in
particular, in the Fourth through Eighth Amendments-are paradigmatically
addressed to law enforcement. In other words, the core, foundational
applications of these rights concern the investigation, prosecution,
adjudication, and punishment of law-violating activity (both criminal and
civil). If the government could evade these rights by privatizing law
enforcement, much of the Fourth through Eighth Amendments would be
rendered nugatory.
For example, it is axiomatic Fourth Amendment doctrine that "general
warrants" are unconstitutional.13 8 General warrants authorized discretionary
searches and seizures of large numbers of persons and places not specified in
advance by a magistrate, in order to enforce civil or criminal laws, and they
were the Fourth Amendment's paradigm case-the primary abuse the
amendment was enacted to prohibit.139 But if governments could privatize
their police forces without the Fourth Amendment attaching thereto, the
privatized police could engage in generalized, unspecified searches and
seizures with constitutional impunity. Similarly, if governments could
replace their criminal and civil courts with private-adjudication contractors
not bound by the Constitution, the core process rights of the Sixth and
Seventh Amendments-for example, trial by jury-would be lost.
The reasoning here is simple but inexorable. It follows from the
existence of constitutional paradigm cases.140 Certain governmental powers
or functions are the paradigmatic objects of constitutional rights. Allowing
government to privatize those powers, cut loose from constitutional
safeguards, would permit the government to evade and erase those
138. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,
480 (1965).
139. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1-31 (1997)
(discussing the centrality of the ban on general warrants to the enactment and historical
understanding of the Fourth Amendment).
140. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 YALE L.J. 1977 (2006)
(showing that paradigmatic "Application Understandings," that is, the core historical applications




constitutional rights. That result cannot be tolerated. Allowing privatization
of law enforcement, without attaching constitutional restraints thereto, would
erase core constitutional rights; therefore, the Constitution must continue to
apply when the government induces private parties to do law enforcement on
its behalf.
This is not to say that law enforcement is an exclusively "public
function" or an "inherently governmental function." Private actors can take,
and have always taken, law enforcement into their own hands. Rather, law
enforcement is an inherently constitutional function for the government,
meaning that state actors cannot circumvent the constitutional rights that
attach to it by inducing private parties to do the job on their behalf
What other powers, beyond law enforcement, belong in this category?
This Article is not the place for a full-fledged theory dealing with that
question, but the general outlines of an answer may be as follows.
When first enacted, the Constitution established a new national
government vested with two powers: that of war, and that of law.
"War powers" is a familiar enough term. The "law power" is less
familiar, but not esoteric. By that term, I'm simply referring to making the
law, executing it, and adjudicating it-the functions that were the primary
objects of Articles I to III of the Constitution. Making law consists primarily
of enacting rules governing individuals' conduct that apply without their
individualized consent. Executing the law includes policing compliance,
prosecuting violators, and punishing violations. Adjudication refers both to
authoritative fact-finding (to determine whether a law has been broken) and
to authoritatively interpreting the law. Making law can also be referred to as
"legislating" or "regulating." Executing the law and adjudicating it, taken
together, can be referred to as "law enforcement."
The war and law powers share certain features in common. Both involve
force. Both can be used to dispense death. Both can be used to coercively
take away liberty and property. Both enable tyranny in any government
vested with them.
Which is precisely what made a Bill of Rights necessary. All the
guarantees laid out in the Bill of Rights are directed, paradigmatically, at the
law or war powers. If this is so, then war making also falls into the special
class of inherently constitutional activities. And if this is so, then-to answer
the question posed at the beginning of this article-private military
contractors would be bound to uphold constitutional rights.14 1
141. Other powers too may carry constitutional restraints when privatized. If, for example, the
state has a constitutional duty to do X, constitutional restraints may be required if the state seeks to
have X done by private actors.
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This highly general law-and-war principle, however, is much broader
than the present article requires. For present purposes, the following, much
narrower principle suffices:
(2) Law enforcement principle. When government requires or
induces a private party to engage in law enforcement, all
relevant constitutional restraints apply.142
Does this law enforcement principle swallow up everything that
government does, making it impossible for governments to privatize anything
without constitutional rights attaching thereto?
No. Governments do a great deal beyond law enforcement-indeed,
beyond the law and war powers altogether. If government privatizes the
construction of buildings, for example, constitutional restraints need not
attach. Governments can privatize their trains and train stations, their
airports, their fire departments, their utilities, their garbage collection, their
community colleges, and their power plants-all without imposing
constitutional requirements on the private parties that take over these
functions. Government could privatize the welfare state.
But policing is different, because it's law enforcement. A state can
contract with private security firms to police its streets and enforce its laws,
but the Constitution will still apply. Privatized prisons fall under the same
rule; the Eighth Amendment directly targets criminal punishment, and
punishing law breakers is central to the business of law enforcement. (This
analysis provides a far better explanation of why courts have found private
142. This principle refers only to cases in which government uses private parties for its own
ends-i.e., when it delegates powers to private parties but continues to direct their objectives-not
cases in which government purports to withdraw altogether, as for example by disbanding its police
completely and "letting the market" take over. Such cases would require a separate analysis. In this
path of inquiry lies the true importance of landmark state action cases like Marsh v. Alabama, 326




prisons to be state actors than current public function doctrine can.)143
Privatized tax collection is also law enforcement.1"
What about private arbitration-is it bound by constitutional due
process? Not if it's genuinely private, freely chosen by private parties. But if
the federal government retained a private arbitral body and compelled its use,
that body would have to abide by due process.145
The most critical feature of the law enforcement principle is that it
answers the level-of-generality problem raised earlier. When law
enforcement powers are privatized-whether by statute, under a contract, or
through a defunding threat-constitutional restraints apply to all the actions
taken by the private parties in discharging their delegated functions, not
merely to those actions specifically mandated.
143. The "extensive history" of private imprisonment in America is well-known. JAMES
AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, EMERGING ISSUES ON
PRIVATIZED PRISONS 9 (2001) ("Private enterprise in the United States has an extensive history of
involvement in the provision of correctional services."); see WILLIAM B. SECREST, BEHIND SAN
QUENTIN'S WALLS: THE HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA'S LEGENDARY PRISON AND ITS INMATES 1851-
1900, at 9-10 (2015):
In early 1851, [General Mariano Guadalupe] Vallejo presented a plan to the state
legislature to establish and maintain a state prison.... Vallejo and his associate, [James
Madison] Estill, would build the prison, staff it, clothe and feed all the convicts, and
offer rewards to be in effect for a ten-year period for any prisoner who escaped. ... All
that was asked in return was that Vallejo and Estill could utilize the convict labor for
their own profit.
Nevertheless, courts have repeatedly held that privatized prisons are state actors under public
function doctrine-a result they have reached only by ignoring or torturing the exclusivity
requirement. See, e.g., Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003)
("Clearly, confinement of wrongdoers-though sometimes delegated to private entities-is a
fundamentally governmental function."); Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991)
(treating a private prison corporation as having acted under color of law without mentioning the
exclusivity requirement). On the analysis proposed here, courts would not need to hold, falsely, that
privatized prisons are "state actors" performing an "exclusively" governmental function; the
principle is simpler-government cannot privatize its law enforcement power without passing on
the applicable constitutional restraints.
144. See, e.g., Cohen v. World Omni Fin. Corp., 457 Fed. Appx. 822, 830 (11th Cir. 2012)
(holding that a private company "was a state actor" in collecting taxes under statutory mandate,
regardless of public function analysis).
145. On just this ground Judge Posner found the National Railroad Adjustment Board to be a
state actor. See, e.g., Elmore v. Chi. & Ill. Midland Ry., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The
National Railroad Adjustment Board, however, while private in fact, is ... the tribunal that
Congress has established to resolve certain disputes in the railroad industry. Its decisions therefore
are acts of government, and must not deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law."). Stock exchange organizations that enforce federal securities laws against broker-dealers
offer another analogy. There is a circuit split concerning whether due process applies to such
proceedings. Jerrod M. Lukacs, Note, Much Ado About Nothing: How the Securities SRO State
Actor Split Has Been Misinterpreted and What It Means for Due Process at FINRA, 47 GA. L. REV.
923, 926 (2013). Assuming these organizations are compelled by the federal government to enforce
the law, state action should be found and due process held applicable, according to the arguments
presented in this Article.
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To see why, we need only consider once again a privatized police force
that decides on its own to engage in house searches without probable cause
or a warrant-or a privatized prison that decides in its own discretion to
torture recalcitrant inmates. Under the law enforcement principle, these
actions are categorically unconstitutional; that the state had not specifically
ordered them would be no defense. When government privatizes its law
enforcement powers, constitutional rights must attach to the delegated
powers in their entirety, not merely to the specific actions dictated by the
state. The reason, to repeat, is straightforward: otherwise, core rights
established by the Fourth through Eighth Amendments could easily be
evaded and essentially erased.
The law enforcement principle is an anti-evasion principle. It's a matter
of preserving the Bill of Rights against circumvention. I will not say more
here defending it. Instead I will assume its premises and return now to private
colleges' Title IX sexual assault hearings.
IV. Do Today's Campus Sexual Assault Hearings Violate Due Process?
A. Which Procedures Are Subject o Due Process Analysis?
Which procedures in campus sexual assault hearings must satisfy
constitutional due process requirements-only those specifically mandated
by the government, or all the procedures used by a school when it complies
with a governmentally imposed duty to prosecute and adjudicate? We are
now in a position to answer this question. In the last section, we identified
two core principles:
(1) Inducement principle. Governments cannot purposely induce
private parties to take actions that would violate constitutional
rights ifstate actors took those actions themselves.
(2) Law enforcement principle. If government requires or induces a
private party to engage in law enforcement, all relevant
constitutional restraints apply.
Under principle (1), those procedural rules specifically mandated by the
Dear Colleague letter for Title IX hearings must plainly satisfy due process-
for example, the standard of proof. Principle (2), however, reaches further.
As we've just seen, under principle (2), if it applies, private schools' Title IX
hearings pursuant to procedures adopted as a result of the Dear Colleague
letter would have to satisfy due process in their entirety.
Does principle (2) apply here? Did the Dear Colleague letter require
schools to engage in law enforcement?
The answer is clearly yes. The Dear Colleague letter required schools to
investigate, charge, adjudicate, and punish law-breaking conduct-the very
definition of law enforcement.
452017]
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It's important to reemphasize the change effected by the Dear Colleague
letter onjust this point. As noted earlier, prior to 2011, by OCR's own express
acknowledgment, a school "was under no obligation to conduct an
independent investigation" in cases involving "a possible violation of the
penal law, the determination of which is the exclusive province of the police
and the office of the district attorney."1 4 6 The Dear Colleague letter reversed
this position. Under the letter, in every case where schools have reason to
know of a "possible" incident of "sexual violence," they must investigate that
offense, charge the alleged perpetrator if sufficient evidence is found,
adjudicate the charge, and impose significant punishment, potentially
including expulsion, on a student found guilty.14 7 In short, schools used to be
able to leave law enforcement o state law enforcement officers, if they chose;
under the Dear Colleague letter, they had to do it themselves.
The language of the Title IX bureaucracy may be calculated to avoid
this appearance: for example, students are usually said to be found
responsible rather than guilty; the word charge is rarely used; the word crime
is almost never used.148 But there can be no doubt that, pursuant to the Dear
Colleague letter, campus Title IX hearings all over the country were (and still
are) discharging core law enforcement functions that previously could be left
to the police.
Some may feel that this conclusion denies or undermines Title IX's
status as a civil rights statute. Campus sexual assault hearings are not about
law enforcement, some might say; they're about educational equality.
The dichotomy is a false one. The question is not either-or. Under the
Dear Colleague letter, Title IX remained of course an equality statute, but
OCR was pursuing Title IX's equality objectives by compelling schools to
do law enforcement on the federal government's behalf.
It is true that universities do not, in their Title IX hearings, expressly
decide whether state law has been violated, but only whether school
disciplinary codes have been violated. And on occasion, students are found
guilty on the basis of conduct that would not violate local criminal (or even
tort) law. A case like Brandeis, which involved kissing a sleeping boyfriend,
might be an illustration. If schools are merely enforcing their own
regulations, and if those regulations cover conduct hat doesn't violate local
criminal or tort law, doesn't that show that Title IX hearings are not enforcing
the law?
146. See supra note 36.
147. See supra notes 40, 47 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 595 (D. Mass. 2016) (observing use
of the term "responsible" in the Brandeis handbook); Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177,
193 (D.R.I. 2016) (observing use of the terms "responsible" and "violation" in Brown's code of
conduct); Tsuruta v. Augustana Univ., No. 4:15-CV-04150-KES, 2015 WL 5838602, at *6 (D.S.D.
Oct. 7, 2015) (referring to proof of a "violation" as required before a "resolution proceeding" may
be initiated).
46 [Vol. 96:15
Privatization & State Action
On the contrary, it confirms and compounds the problem: the Dear
Colleague letter had universities enforcing federal law in just the same way
Congress characteristically has administrative agencies enforce federal law.
Congress frequently sets out a general statutory prohibition (for
example, employers must not subject employees to unsafe working
conditions),14 9 instructing an administrative agency first to enact regulations
defining that prohibition, and then to investigate, charge, adjudicate, and
punish violations thereof.so When agencies follow these directives, they are
plainly enforcing the law, however broadly or narrowly they choose to define
the prohibition Congress has established for them.
In exactly the same way, the Dear Colleague letter told schools they had
to enact regulations proscribing "sexual assault" or "sexual violence"-terms
that undoubtedly cover core acts of criminal and tortious assault and that are
in turn further defined by the Department of Education to include all
unconsented-to sexual activity.'"' Schools were then told to investigate,
adjudicate, and punish every alleged instance of sexual violence, so defined.
This is the very model of regulatory or administrative law enforcement:
schools are positioned here, in relation to the Department of Education,
exactly as administrative agencies are positioned in relation to Congress.
Just as OSHA is doing law enforcement on Congress's behalf when its
workplace safety regulations go beyond local criminal or tort law, so too are
schools doing law enforcement on OCR's behalf when their sexual assault
regulations go beyond local criminal or tort law. The Dear Colleague letter,
not metaphorically but literally, turned schools all over the country into
federal regulatory field agents.152
Does this mean that every employer in the country, directed by federal
statute to police its employees' compliance with federal laws, is a "state
actor"? Must every Title VII workplace harassment hearing necessarily
provide constitutional due process? No.
The distinction between mere law compliance and law enforcement is
critical here. All laws require compliance; few impose on private parties
duties of law enforcement. Speed limit laws require you to obey the speed
149. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2012) ("Each employer ... shall furnish to each of his
employees employment and aplace of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees . . . .").
150. See, e.g., id. § 655 (authorizing and establishing procedure for promulgation, modification,
and revocation of occupational safety and health regulations); id. § 657 (authorizing inspections,
investigations, and record-keeping); id. § 659 (outlining enforcement procedure).
151. See supra note 52.
152. Moreover, several states have passed statutes requiring schools to enact "affirmative
consent" definitions of sexual assault. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(1); see generally 50
States of Consent, AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT, http://affirmativeconsent.com/affirmative-consent-
laws-state-by-state [https://perma.cc/4P32-GRZ5] (maintaining a list of state affirmative consent




limit, but they don't require you to enforce the speed limit against anyone
else. (That's the job of the police-of law enforcement.) Compliance means
discharging one's own obligations under a law; enforcement means policing,
adjudicating, and punishing others' violations. 153
The Dear Colleague letter turned schools into law enforcers in just this
sense. The letter not only required schools to ensure that they themselves
complied with Title IX-ensuring, that is, that their officers, supervisors, and
other agents did not discriminate. More than this, it required schools to
police, adjudicate, and punish sexual assaults committed by third parties,
namely their students. Students are not a university's agents.154 By contrast,
employees are their employer's agents.155 Hence, while Title VII demands
law compliance from employers, the Dear Colleague letter had universities
engaged in paradigmatic law enforcement.
Thus, in every Title IX sexual assault hearing conducted as a result of
the Dear Colleague letter, due process applies. Not only must the specific
procedural mandates of the Dear Colleague letter satisfy due process. The
entire adjudicatory process must do so as well.
A judge that so held today, although contradicting several district courts,
would not be without precedent. In 1969, New York passed a statute
requiring every private college in that state to enact "'rules and regulations
for the maintenance of public order on college campuses,"' including
providing for "'suspension, expulsion or other appropriate disciplinary
action' for student violators."1 56 In 1970, twenty-four students were expelled
from a private college on Staten Island under rules the school had enacted
pursuant to that statute.157 The students brought a due process claim.s15 The
district judge dismissed for lack of state action, but the Second Circuit
reversed.159
153. The same distinction-between law compliance and law enforcement-underlies Printz
v. United States, which holds that while Congress may require states to comply with laws of general
applicability, it may not require states to "implement," "enact or administer a federal regulatory
program." 521 U.S. 898, 925, 933 (1997) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992)).
154. See Miles v. Washington, No. CIV-08-166-JIHP, 2009 WL 259722, at *4 (E.D. Okla.
Feb. 2, 2009) ("The students are not agents of the school and their actions cannot be considered the
actions of the school."); Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 171 n.7
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[S]tudents are not agents of the school."); Hanson v. Kynast, 494 N.E.2d 1091,
1095 (Ohio 1986) ("[A] student is not an agent of a university . . . .").
155. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006) ("The
elements of common-law agency are present in the relationship[] between employer and
employee .... ).
156. Coleman v. Wagner Coll., 429 F.2d 1120, 1122 (2d Cir. 1970) (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 6450 (McKinney 2016) (repealed 2004)).
157. Id. at 1121-22.
158. Id. at 1123.
159. Id. at 1123, 1125.
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A two-judge majority held that, although the statute on its face only
required schools to have a disciplinary code-saying nothing, in other words,
about what the codes should prohibit-further inquiry into the statute's intent
and application was warranted:
[S]pecifically, section 6450 may [have been] intended or applied as a
command to the colleges of the state to adopt a new, more severe
attitude toward campus disruption and to impose harsh sanctions on
unruly students. The Governor's Memorandum approving section
6450 referred to an "intolerable situation on the Cornell University
Campus" and spoke of "the urgent need for adequate plans for student-
university relations." . . . If these considerations have merit and
section 6450 was intended to coerce colleges to adopt disciplinary
codes embodying a "hard-line" attitude toward student protesters, it
would appear that New York has indeed "undertaken to set policy for
the control of demonstrations in all private universities" and should
be held responsible for the implementation of this policy.160
Reactions at other New York schools, said the majority, would be
relevant on remand. "A reasonable and widespread belief among college
administrators," held the court, "that section 6450 required them to adopt a
particular stance toward campus demonstrators would seem to justify a
conclusion that the state intended for them to pursue that course of action.
And this intent, if present, would provide a basis for a finding of state
action."i16
The third judge was Henry Friendly, who, concurring, said that state
action was already established and that no further inquiry was necessary:
[D]o not rules of private colleges framed in response to a state mandate
have a significantly different symbolic appearance than rules
formulated in the absence of such a statute? ... [O]bjections to the
very existence of a detailed code would be met by the answer that one
was state-compelled. When a state has gone so far in directing private
action that citizens may reasonably believe this to have been taken at
the state's instance, state action may legitimately be found even
though the state left the private actors almost complete freedom of
choice.162
160. Id. at 1124-25 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 1125.
162. Id. at 1126-27 (Friendly, J., concurring). In 1988, the Second Circuit returned to the same
statute and found no state action in a private college's disciplinary proceedings, on the grounds that
the statute contained nothing about the content of the required disciplinary codes, that "the state's
role under the [statute] has been merely to keep on file rules submitted by colleges and universities,"
that the state "has never sought to compel schools to enforce these rules and has never even inquired
about such enforcement," and that there was no "evidence whatsoever that any private college
administrators anywhere in the State of New York believe, reasonably or not, that the [statute]
requires that particular sanctions be imposed . . . ." Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 568, 570 (2d
Cir. 1988) (en banc). What OCR has done is obviously distinguishable.
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The Dear Colleague letter presents a striking parallel, except that the
federal government went much further than the New York legislature did.
The federal government unquestionably "set policy"-an explicit, detailed
sexual assault policy-for all private universities; it unquestionably
demanded that schools adopt "a 'hard-line' attitude"; it dictated important
procedural rules that schools had to incorporate into their disciplinary codes;
and it unquestionably warned schools to "impose harsh sanctions" on
violators, at the peril of losing their federal funding. Under the Second
Circuit's reasoning, the federal government was therefore "responsible for
the implementation of this policy."l63
B. The ChiefDue Process Requirements for Title IX Sexual Assault
Hearings
Outside of criminal law, where strict and well-known procedural rules
govern, due process requirements are said to be decided by a "balancing test"
under Mathews v. Eldridge.'" As everyone knows, however, "balancing
tests" can generate virtually any outcome a decision maker wants.165 The
result is that little can be said with certainty in this area, and everything will
ultimately depend on the instincts, attitudes, and ideologies of the particular
judges who make the final determinations.16 6 All the same, there are some
procedural rules that serve as bedrock in our system. Accordingly, the
following sections will identify those bedrock rules and, with respect to other
matters, will highlight the most prominent issues, rather than trying
definitively to resolve them.
1. Notice and Hearing.-The most fundamental, minimal requirements
of due process are notice and a hearing.167 The Supreme Court has insisted
163. Id.
164. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); see, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444-48 (2011)
(applying the Mathews factors to a civil contempt proceeding).
165. See Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 645 (1988):
If we take balancing seriously, as a legitimate means of deciding cases, we not only
invite the possibility that different judges may treat the same case differently, we
abandon the grounds upon which to consider this situation problematic. The internal
logic of balancing is not offended by this state of affairs; differentjudges mean different
world views, and different world views are acceptable.
166. See Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind ofHearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1278 (1975)
(describing the procedural balancing test as "uncertain and subjective").
167. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 ("The essence of due process is the requirement that 'a
person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet
it."' (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be
heard." (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914))).
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on these requirements even in public high school disciplinary proceedings.168
In 1998, a federal appellate court held that "procedural due process" on
college campuses (in a state school) required "adequate notice, definite
charge, and a hearing ... with all necessary protective measures."69 Thus,
inquisitorial processes like those described in Doe v. Brandeis-where, as
summarized earlier, the accused had no right to be informed of the charges
against him, no right to confront the evidence against him, and no hearing in
its usual sense-are plainly unconstitutional.
It defies belief that courts would permit a governmental agency to have
students judged guilty of sexual assault, to have a permanent notation thereof
placed in their academic records, and to impose other punishment therefor,
without at a minimum informing the accused of the allegations against him
and providing a hearing at which he could confront and rebut the evidence
against him. But that's exactly what the Department of Education was doing
through the Dear Colleague letter. The only difference is that DOE achieved
this result by inducing private schools like Brandeis to take the
unconstitutional actions on its behalf.
Kafka-esque failures of notice, sometimes accompanied by significant
threats to free speech, are disturbingly common in the Title IX process.
Professor Laura Kipnis of Northwestern University has written of being
charged with a Title IX violation after publishing an essay in the Chronicle
ofHigher Education.17 0 Her university hired a team of lawyers to investigate
168. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) ("At the very minimum, . . . students facing
suspension. . must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing."). Due process
applies only when "property" or "liberty" interests are threatened, but the law is clear under Goss-
and has been clear for decades-that university disciplinary proceedings threaten such interests, at
least where the student faces suspension or expulsion. See, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418
F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he Due Process Clause is implicated by higher education
disciplinary decisions."); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying Goss to a
school disciplinary hearing); Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 136 F. Supp. 3d 854, 865 (S.D. Ohio 2016)
("Disciplinary processes [at universities] implicate due process because they have the potential to
deprive a student of either 'the liberty interest in reputation' or 'the property interest in education
benefits temporarily denied."' (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 576)). But cf Krainski v. Nevada ex rel.
Bd. of Regents, 616 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that it was not "clearly established" that
students not "suspended or expelled" had a right to due process in disciplinary hearings).
169. Woodis v. Westark Cmty. Coll., 160 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Jones v.
Snead, 431 F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 1970)); see also, e.g., Hennessy v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d
237, 250 (1st Cir. 1999) ("A hearing-or the offer of one-usually is necessary when a school takes
serious disciplinary action against a student." (emphasis omitted)); Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837
F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Indeed, in student discipline cases, since [Dixon v. Alabama State Board
ofEducation, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961)], the federal courts have uniformly held that fair process
requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before the expulsion or significant suspension of a
student from a public school."); Jenkins v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992, 1003 (5th Cir.
1975) ("There is no question but that a student charged with misconduct has a right to an impartial
tribunal.").




the charges against her."' These lawyers, when they contacted Professor
Kipnis, refused to provide her with the complaint and initially refused to tell
her what she had been accused of.172 Similarly, in Brandeis, the accused party
had to guess at the accusations against him through the questions put to him
by the investigator.1 73
Yale's "informal complaint" process allows a Title IX officer to
investigate complaints without telling the accused student what he has been
accused of doing or who has accused him.174 At San Diego State University,
administrators sent out a campus-wide email warning of an alleged sexual
assault and naming the accused student,175 but again, the school refused to
tell the accused student not only who had accused him, but what he had been
accused of.176 Unsatisfied by the student's responses to the unspecified
allegations, the school ordered him to leave campus; only later, having found
out the identity of his accuser, was the student able to submit evidence that
led to his exoneration.17 7 There should be little doubt: these procedures are
unconstitutional.
2. If a Hearing Is Held.-Assuming a school does hold a hearing, what
are its minimal due process conditions?
Let's first consider cross-examination: as noted earlier, OCR
specifically warned schools not to permit cross-examination of the
complainant.1 78 Instead, typically, following OCR recommendations, schools
171. Jonathan H. Adler, Northwestern's Kipnis Cleared in Title IXInvestigation, WASH. POST:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2015/06/01/northwesterns-kipnis-cleared-in-title-ix-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ9F-
ZJKL].
172. See Erik Wemple, Northwestern University Professor Laura Kipnis Details Title IX
Investigation over Essay, WASH. POST (May 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2015/05/29/northwestern-university-professor-laura-kipnis-details-title-ix-
investigation-over-essay/ [https://perma.cc/D6CU-XK8L] ("Kipnis wasn't allowed to have an
attorney with her for her meeting with investigators; she wasn't apprised of her charges before the
meeting; she had to fight with the investigators over recording the session.").
173. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 583 (D. Mass. 2016) ("[lIt was not until
February 2014, when John had his first interview with the Special Examiner, that he began to learn
of the factual allegations behind the charges. Even then, John was forced to speculate based on the
particular questions the Special Examiner asked him about certain incidents." (citation omitted)).
174. YALE UNIV., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, UWC PROCEDURES 3 (2015), provost.yale.edu/
sites/default/files/files/UWC%20Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TTD-JQDP].
175. Charles M. Sevilla, Campus Sexual Assault Allegations, Adjudications, and Title IX, 39
CHAMPION 16, 17 (2015) ("As soon as SDSU received notice of the complaining witness's sexual
assault allegation, it sent an email blast across the campus warning of the threat he posed-naming
him in the more than 20,000 emails.").
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra Section I(B); QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX, supra note 53, at 31
("strongly discourag[ing] a school from allowing the parties to personally question or cross-examine
each other during a hearing on alleged sexual violence").
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allow the accused to submit questions to a hearing panelist, who "screens"
the questions and decides whether or in what words to pose them.'7 9
Moreover, cross-examination is frequently prevented even as to other
witnesses. At many schools, a Title IX investigator reports to the decision
makers either in writing or orally about interviews he has conducted.s0 There
is no requirement that these investigators record their interviews-indeed, as
in Professor Kipnis's case, they may not even permit a recording to be
made'mt-so there will be no independent way to verify that the investigator's
report of what the witnesses said is accurate and complete. In such cases, the
investigator presents hearsay summaries of statements allegedly made by
other individuals, whom the accused student is never given an opportunity to
confront or cross-examine directly.
179. See id. ("A school may choose, instead, to allow the parties to submit questions to a trained
third party (e.g., the hearing panel) to ask the questions on their behalf. OCR recommends that the
third party screen the questions submitted by the parties and only ask those it deems appropriate and
relevant to the case."). Yale's policy allows "each party ... to submit questions for the panel to ask
the other party or witness. The panel, at its sole discretion, may choose which, if any, questions to
ask." YALE UNIV., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, supra note 174, at 6; see also, e.g., UNIV. OF VA.,
APPENDIX A: PROCEDURES FOR REPORTS AGAINST STUDENTS 17, https://eocr.virginia.edu/
appendixa [https://perma.cc/9LP4-C4LL] ("The parties may not directly question each another [sic]
or any witness, although they may proffer questions for the Review Panel, which may choose, in its
discretion, to pose appropriate and relevant questions to the Investigator, the parties and/or any
witnesses."); UNIV. OF KAN., STUDENT NON-ACADEMIC CONDUCT PROCEDURES 9 (2015),
http://policy.ku.edu/sites/policy.ku.edu/files/Non%2OAcademic%20Misconduct%20Procedures_R
evised%208.21.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BEZ-C7RG] ("Only the Chair and Panel members are
given absolute authority to directly question parties and witnesses. At the discretion of the Chair,
parties may directly question witnesses and each other, but the Chair is empowered to have
questions directed to the Chair, disallow or reframe any questions.").
180. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIV., APPENDIX A3: OVERVIEW OF FAS PROCEDURES ON SEXUAL
AND GENDER-BASED HARASSMENT BY STUDENTS 2, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/files/fas/files/
appendix.a3_overview of fas procedures-students.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HCL-K52S]:
Once the [Investigator's] report has been given to the Complainant, the Respondent,
and the Title IX Coordinator, the report is forwarded to the School's Administrative
Board for consideration of discipline. The Administrative Board must accept as final
the ODR report's findings of fact and its conclusions about policy violations; the
Board's only role is to determine the appropriate discipline to administer in response
to the violation.
Id.; UNIV. OF CAL., STUDENT ADJUDICATION MODEL FOR SEXUAL VIOLENCE & SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASES 10 (2016), https://students.ucsd.edu/_files/student-conduct/ucsd-sexual-
violence-sexual-harassment-adjudication-implementing-procedures 1-4-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YMK7-M3XU] ("The Title IX investigator will be present at the appeal hearing. The Appeal Body
may question the investigator.. .. The investigation report ... will be entered as evidence at the appeal
hearing.").
181. Kipnis, supra note 170:
They told me, cordially, that they wanted to set up a meeting during which they would
inform me of the charges and pose questions.... We finally agreed to schedule a Skype
session in which they would inform me of the charges and I would not answer




At least one judge-in a Title IX case involving a state school-has
found that both these limitations on cross-examination violated due process,
but that opinion was reversed on appeal,182 and the appellate court's ruling
squares with existing case law. Prior to the recent Title IX controversies,
several federal courts had held that due process does not require cross-
examination in school disciplinary proceedings-or at least that the accused
has no "right to unlimited cross-examination."183 A school disciplinary
hearing is not a criminal trial and should not be turned into one, especially
given that litigation-style cross-examination can be extremely painful for
victims of sexual assault.
A troubling consideration, however, is that campus sexual assaults
frequently lack physical evidence or corroborating eye witnesses.184 Indeed,
this "absence of corroborating evidence" has served as the basis for
arguments in favor of the preponderance of the evidence standard (discussed
further below), on the theory that higher evidentiary standards "make it
inevitable that date rapists will be frequently acquitted."8 But if the evidence
in a campus sexual assault trial consists solely or primarily of the
complainant's statement, and especially if the burden of proof is lowered for
that reason, cross-examination would be more critical than it might be in
other disciplinary proceedings. In such a case, some opportunity to directly
question the complainant, and challenge his or her statements, would seem
essential to due process.
The ultimate question is what sort of cross-examination rights judges
would insist on for a student if the Department of Education itself had
conducted the hearing and, say, found the student guilty of sexual assault and
therefore expelled him from his university. What an agency cannot
constitutionally do itself, it cannot make private parties do.
182. A California trial court found that the procedure employed by the University of California
at San Diego was "unfair" because it did not allow the accused to cross-examine the complainant.
Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 479, 494 (2016). Reversing, the appellate
court observed that "there is no California or federal authority requiring an accused be permitted, in
a disciplinary hearing, to directly question the complainant." Id. at 504.
183. Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988) ("As for the right to cross-
examination, suffice it to state that the right to unlimited cross-examination has not been deemed an
essential requirement of due process in school disciplinary cases."); see, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ.,
812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Where basic fairness is preserved, we have not required the
cross-examination of witnesses and a full adversary proceeding."); Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d
545, 549 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The right to cross-examine witnesses generally has not been considered
an essential requirement of due process in school disciplinary proceedings.").
184. Lavinia M. Weizel, Note, The Process That is Due: Preponderance ofthe Evidence as the
Standard of Prooffor University Adjudications of Student-on-Student Sexual Assault Complaints,
53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1649 (2012).
185. See, e.g., Katherine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 691 (1999).
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The same analysis applies to the other components of Title IX hearings,
which vary from school to school. Some block lawyers from participating;186
others permit it. "I Almost no schools provide a lawyer to a student who can't
afford one." At some schools, accused students may call witnesses, while at
others, that prerogative is vested in the hearing panel.189 Due process analysis
will demand that courts look at each case on its own facts, but the question
should always be whether the procedures would satisfy due process were a
federal agency conducting the hearing itself.
If courts are looking for a list of procedures to satisfy due process, they
might do well to start with a case decided almost fifty years ago, when two
state college students in Missouri had been suspended for allegedly
participating in riots.'" The court ordered the college to grant the students a
new hearing with the following procedures:
(1) a written statement of the charges to be furnished each plaintiff at
least 10 days prior to the date of the hearing;
(2) the hearing shall be conducted before the President of the college;
(3) plaintiffs shall be permitted to inspect in advance of such hearing
any affidavits or exhibits which the college intends to submit at the
hearing;
186. See, e.g., Conduct Process Settings, U. NOTRE DAME, http://dulac.nd.edu/community-
standards/process/settings/#hearing [https://perma.cc/J6JP-8G46] ("The student may be
accompanied, but not represented, by a University Support Person at the Hearing. A University
Support Person may be any University of Notre Dame student, faculty or staff member, with the
exception of parents and attorneys.... The student may not proceed through an attorney."); see also
Allie Grasgreen, Students Lawyer Up, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 26, 2013), https://www
.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/26/north-carolina-becomes-first-state-guarantee-students-
option-lawyer-disciplinary [https://perma.cc/4WVW-8SZ3] ("Previously, institutions in the 17-
campus UNC System allowed lawyers to attend hearings only when a student was also being tried
in criminal court, and only to advise. (Most universities operate this way, or do not permit lawyers
at all.)").
187. E.g., UNIV. OF KAN., STUDENT NON-ACADEMIC CONDUCT PROCEDURES 8 (2015),
http://policy.ku.edu/sites/policy.ku.edu/files/Non%20Academic%20Misconduct%20Procedures_R
evised%208.21.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y69M-YFUW] ("The complainant and the respondent
shall submit to the Vice Provost for Student Affairs, or designee, . . . the name of their advisor(s)
and if s/he is an attorney. . . .").
188. On the contrary, the current debate is whether students will be allowed to be represented
by attorneys that the students pay for. See Grasgreen, supra note 180 ("The legislation, signed into
law on Friday, guarantees any student at a public institution in the state the right to legal
representation, at the student's expense, during campus judiciary proceedings." (emphasis added));
Tovia Smith, For Students Accused of Campus Rape, Legal Victories Win Back Rights, NPR
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/15/446083439/for-students-accused-ofcampus-rape-
legal-victories-win-back-rights [https://perma.cc/NB6W-KR5R] (discussing the bill for the Safe
Campus Act, which would require that institutions "permit each party to the proceeding to be
represented, at the sole expense of the party, by an attorney or other advocate for the duration of the
proceeding .... " H.R. 3403, 114th Con. § 164(a)(4) (2015) (emphasis added)).
189. See, e.g., YALE UNIV., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, supra note 174, at 6 ("At its sole
discretion, the panel may request the testimony of additional witnesses.").
190. Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 277 F. Supp. 649, 650-51 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
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(4) plaintiffs shall be permitted to have counsel present with them at
the hearing to advise them;
(5) plaintiffs shall be afforded the right to present their version as to
the charges and to make such showing by way of affidavits,
exhibits, and witnesses as they desire;
(6) plaintiffs shall be permitted to hear the evidence presented against
them, and plaintiffs (not their attorney) may question at the hearing
any witness who gives evidence against them;
(7) the President shall determine the facts of each case solely on the
evidence presented at the hearing therein and shall state in writing
his finding as to whether or not the student charged is guilty of the
conduct charged and the disposition to be made, if any, by way of
disciplinary action;
(8) either side may, at its own expense, make a record of the events at
the hearing.19 '
These procedures obviously need updating. Instead of the university
president, cases should be tried before impartial decisionmakers. Instead of
access to "affidavits" or "exhibits," the accused should be given prehearing
access to the investigator's report. Cross-examination of the complainant
should be done by someone representing the accused, not by the accused
himself. Both sides should be entitled to call witnesses. And modem
conceptions of due process might require that the school provide an attorney
to students who can't afford one.
3. Competence and Impartiality.-There are, however, still deeper and
more structural problems in campus Title IX rape adjudications: in particular,
problems of basic competence and partiality. Sexual assault is not like
plagiarism, a matter well within academic expertise. Not to put too fine a
point on it, but faculty, administrators, and students often have little idea what
they're doing when called on to judge rape allegations, which can lead to
errors in both directions.
In one Title IX case, a faculty member reportedly had to ask the
complainant to explain anal sex.192 At many schools, fellow students-who
may well know the parties or at any rate know people who know them-sit
191. Id. at 651-52.
192. Vanessa Grigoriadis, Meet the College Women Who Are Starting a Revolution Against
Campus Sexual Assault, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 21, 2014), http://nymag.com/thecut/2014/09/emma-
sulkowicz-campus-sexual-assault-activism.html [https://perma.cc/L9JK-H7KE] (quoting a sexual
assault claimant as saying that judges "kept asking me to explain the position I was in .... At one
point, I was like, 'Should I just draw you a picture?' So I drew a stick drawing," and stating that
"one of the three judges even asked whether [the accused] used lubricant, commenting, 'I don't
know how it's possible to have anal sex without lubrication first"').
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as judges.1 93 in one case, a college bookstore manager served as a judge.1 94
"Our disciplinary and grievance procedures," as the American Council on
Education-which represents 1,700 higher education institutions-has put it,
"were designed to provide appropriate resolution of institutional standards
for student conduct, especially with respect to academic matters. They were
never meant for misdemeanors, let alone felonies."1 9 5
The truth is that academic institutions are self-interested parties in their
own campus rape cases. Their self-interest can bias them in some cases
against victims, in others against the accused. Cases currently pending may
reveal egregious instances where sexual assailants have been falsely
exonerated or insufficiently punished because of their connection to
important school sports teams.1 96 But as pressure has mounted from the
opposite direction, schools today can have powerful incentives-legal and
reputational-to find guilt. 19 7
Courts have acknowledged this possibility, while rejecting it as a basis
for holding that a school violated Title IX or the Constitution. "It may well
be," stated one district court recently, "that a desire to avoid Title IX liability
193. See, e.g., Office of the Provost, Title IX FAQs, YALE U. (Feb. 3, 2014),
http://provost.yale.edu/title-ix/faq [https://perma.cc/7WE7-3EHA] ("Undergraduate, graduate, and
professional students are appointed as members of the UWC and sit on formal hearing panels
reviewing student complaints."); Sara Ganim & Nelli Black, An Imperfect Process: How Campuses
Deal with Sexual Assault, CNN (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/22/us/campus-
sexual-assault-tribunals/ [https://perma.cc/9JZY-9N7W] ("From campus to campus, the process
varies. Some have students on the panels, some don't.").
194. See Walt Bogdanich, Reporting Rape, and Wishing She Hadn't, N.Y. TIMES (July 12,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/us/how-one-college-handled-a-sexual-assault-
complaint.html [https://perma.cc/3C2Q-E9GY] ("The [panel] chairwoman, Sandra E. Bissell, vice
president of human resources, was joined by Brien Ashdown, an assistant professor of psychology,
and Lucille Smart, director of the campus bookstore, who the school said had expressed an interest
in serving.").
195. Letter from Molly C. Broad, President, American Council on Educ., to Senators Tom
Harkin and Lamar Alexander, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions 2 (June 25, 2014),
http://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/Letter-Senate-HELP-Sexual-Assault-Hearing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8R89-E8BB].
196. See, e.g., Nick Martin, Lawsuit Alleges Baylor Officials Ignored Multiple Claims ofSexual
Assault, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2016/03/3 1/lawsuit-alleges-baylor-officials-ignored-multiple-claims-of-sexual-assault/
[https://perma.cc/7S2X-DPCZ] (describing lawsuit allegations that school officials ignored multiple
sexual assault reports against then-football player T vin Elliot, who is now serving a twenty-year
sentence for ape); Anita Wadhwani & Matt Slovin, Two More Women Join University of Tennessee
Sexual Assault Lawsuit, TENNESSEAN (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.tennessean.com/story/sports/
college/ut/2016/02/24/women-join-ut-sexual-assault-suit/80860462/ [https://perma.cc/L74K-
WATB] (summarizing allegations including that a football player was allowed to reenroll "even
after an internal investigation found that he had assaulted one of the new plaintiffs").
197. See Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. Ky. L. REV. 49, 71, 74-75 (describing OCR pressure on
colleges to reinvestigate cases where students have been previously found not guilty); Sara Lipka,
The 'Fearmonger', CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 20, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/
TheFearmonger/129833 [https://perma.cc/R9HK-8RC9] (describing "panic" over the threat of
federal investigation).
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to the alleged victims of sexual assault or an effort to persuade the DOE and
others that it takes sexual assault complaints seriously caused Columbia to
'maladminister' Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing, as he alleges," but "that is
not discrimination against Plaintiff because of sex."198 Nor could a due
process claim be stated, according to the court, because "constitutional claims
may be brought only against 'state actors.'"
99
Some Title IX advocates argue that these biases are good for the process.
"If there were only pressure one way," according to Michelle Anderson,
"you'd have a problem. But you have pressure on both sides," and that "will
lead to more equitable and fair outcomes."200 It's disturbing and
disheartening for a law professor to make this kind of argument. Two
conflicts of interest do not equal impartiality. A more likely result is that in
some schools, or in some cases, one bias will dominate, and in others the
other-undermining everyone's prospects for a fair adjudication.
One piece of the partiality problem may be the government-mandated
creation at every school of a Title IX office vested with training,
prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory authority.201 Title IX
bureaucracies are a growth industry in the academy today,2 02 and the
"training" they offer is sometimes less than fully objective. At Stanford,
training materials given to student jurors advised them of certain "indicators"
on the part of an accused man that he is an "abuser," which included
"feel[ing] victimized" by the accusation and "act[ing] persuasive and
logical." 203 At Ohio State, the Title IX office's training materials for hearing
judges included:
statements like a "[v]ictim centered approach can lead to safer campus
communities"; "[s]ex offenders are overwhelmingly white males";
"[i]n a large study of college men, 8.8% admitted rape or attempted
rape"; "[s]ex offenders are experts in rationalizing their behavior"; and
198. Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 371 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
199. Id. at 368 n.5.
200. Michelle Anderson, Dean, CUNY Sch. of Law, Transcript of Debate on Courts, Not
Campuses, Should Decide Sexual Assault Cases, INTELLIGENCE SQUARED U.S. 28 (Sept. 17, 2015),
http://www.intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/courts-not-campuses-should-decide-sexual-assault-
cases [https://perma.cc/GEN7-4VWG].
201. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 33, at 7; see Elizabeth Bartholet et al., supra note
118, (expressing concern about vesting investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory authority in
"a Title IX compliance office rather than an entity that could be considered structurally impartial").
202. Gersen & Suk, supra note 37, at 904 ("Schools must employ Title IX coordinators to
oversee their compliance . . . . At some schools this is a single person, but at many schools this
entails an entire office, staff, and structure dedicated to implementing federal directives regarding
regulation of sexual conduct.").
203. Mike Armstrong & Daniel Barton, Opinion, A Thumb on the Scale ofJustice, STAN. DAILY
(Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.stanforddaily.com/2011/04/29/op-ed-a-thumb-on-the-scale-of-justice/
[https://perma.cc/965X-AYYJ].
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"22-57% of college men report perpetrating a form of
sexually aggressive behavior."204
In a recent case involving Washington and Lee University, the plaintiff,
found guilty of sexual intercourse without consent, asserted that:
[the complainant had] attended a presentation put on by W & L's
Title IX Officer, Lauren Kozak ("Ms. Kozak"). During Ms. Kozak's
presentation, she introduced an article, Is it Possible That There Is
Something In Between Consensual Sex And Rape. .. And That It
Happens To Almost Every Girl Out There? ... to make her point that
"regret equals rape," and went on to state her belief that this point was
a new idea everyone, herself included, is starting to agree with.205
An "impartial tribunal" is of course fundamental to due process,206 but
Washington and Lee is a private university, and so as usual, the court found
that due process did not apply. "Had Plaintiff been enrolled at a public
university," said the court, "he would have been entitled to due process and
the proceedings against him might have unfolded quite differently."207
4. Burden of Proof-Finally, there is the government-mandated
standard of proof. Of the Dear Colleague letter's many procedural directives,
its imposition of the preponderance of the evidence standard drew the most
attention.20 8
There are three well-recognized standards of proof in the American legal
system: "preponderance of the evidence," which is just another way of saying
"more likely than not"; "clear and convincing evidence"; and criminal law's
"beyond a reasonable doubt."209 Some schools previously used the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard in their disciplinary hearings-and still do,
for nonsexual offenses.2 10 Critics of the Dear Colleague letter argue that the
204. Doe v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:15-cv-2830, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21064, at *8-9 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 22, 2016).
205. Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-cv-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *3 (W.D. Va.
Aug. 5, 2015).
206. E.g., Jenkins v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992, 1003 (5th Cir. 1975) ("There is no
question but that a student charged with misconduct has a right to an impartial tribunal.").
207. Wash. & Lee, 2015 WL 4647996, at *8.
208. See, e.g., Amy Chmielewski, Defending the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in
College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 145 (2013) ("Much of the
media attention directed at the Dear Colleague Letter has focused on the preponderance of the
evidence standard. . . ."); Valerie Bauerlein, In Campus Rape Tribunals, Some Men See Injustice,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-campus-rape-tribunals-some-men-see-
injustice-1428684187 [https://perma.cc/V4SZ-TNHJ] (discussing the preponderance of evidence
standard at length and garnering over 700 comments and over 1,100 Facebook shares).
209. See Chmielewski, supra note 208, at 150 (discussing the standards of proof in the
American legal system).
210. See, e.g., UWS Chapter 17: Student Nonacademic Disciplinary Procedures, U. WIS.
WHITEWATER § 17.12(4)(f) (2009), https://www.uww.edu/student-handbook/system-17intro
[https://perna.cc/AQ2U-YBAU] (stating the evidentiary standard of clear and convincing for some
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preponderance standard affords insufficient protection for students accused
of sexual assault.211
But as the letter's supporters have pointed out, "more likely than not" is
the most common and widely accepted burden of proof in the American legal
system, used in the overwhelming majority of civil suits.2 12 Outside of
criminal law, the Supreme Court has found it unconstitutional only very
occasionally, when an individual was threatened with extraordinary
sanctions-for example, civil commitment, termination of parental rights, or
deportation.213  The preponderance standard is even used at criminal
sentencing hearings.214 Thus the notion that the preponderance standard
might be unconstitutional in Title IX hearings faces steep obstacles.
The issue is not, however, quite open-and-shut.
The Court has frequently stated that "fundamental fairness" may require
an "intermediate standard of proof' where the threatened penalty is grievous
and involves "'stigma, "'215 and lower courts have often applied this precept
to "quasi-criminal" proceedings. "'[C]lear and convincing' evidence is
required," a state supreme court has put it, "in various quasi-criminal
proceedings or where the proceedings threaten the individual involved
with ... a stigma."2 16 Clear and convincing evidence has been held required
offenses but preponderance of the evidence for all sexual offenses); N. (B.) Procedures for
Disciplinary Cases, HARV. LAW SCH. (2016), http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/academics/handbook/
rules-relating-to-law-school-studies/xii-administrative-board/b-procedures-for-disciplinary-cases-
except-for-cases-covered-under-the-law-schools-interim-sexual-harassment-policies-and-
procedures-see-appendix-viii/ [https://perma.cc/36V4-59T7] (establishing "clear and convincing
evidence" as the standard for all disciplinary sanctions with the exception of sexual offenses).
211. See, e.g., Statement, Comm. on Women in the Acad. Profession, Am. Ass'n Univ.
Professors, Campus Sexual Assault: Suggested Policies and Procedures 371 (2012),
https://www.aaup.org/file/Sexual AssaultPolicies.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED8T-SDLJ] ("The
AAUP advocates the continued use of 'clear and convincing evidence' in . . . discipline cases as a
necessary safeguard of due process and shared governance.").
212. Nancy Chi Cantalupo, For the Title IX Civil Rights Movement: Congratulations and
Cautions, 125 YALE L.J. F. 281, 290-91 (2016), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/for-the-title-
ix-civil-rights-movement-congratulations-and-cautions [https://perma.cc/N2DA-WH58] ("In
reality the preponderance standard is used in the vast majority of cases, not only in internal
disciplinary proceedings but also in other administrative or civil court proceedings and under other
civil rights statutes that protect equality." (footnotes omitted)).
213. See Herman v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (citing cases).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Gerick, 568 F. App'x 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2014). But cf Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for facts
increasing potential maximum sentence).
215. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756-57 (1982) (citing cases).
216. Riley Hill Gen. Contractor v. Tandy Corp., 737 P.2d 595, 602 (Or. 1987). In Chenega
Mgmt. v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 556 (2010), the court observed that:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that a "quasi-
criminal" claim requires the application of the clear and convincing standard. Recently,
the United States Court of Federal Claims also has held that "clear and convincing"
evidence is required to prove a violation of FAR 3.101-1, i.e., "[g]overnment business
shall be conducted in a manner above reproach ... with complete impartiality and with
preferential treatment for none."
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for violations of a city ordinance prohibiting conduct of a "criminal nature"
but punishable only by a fine,2 17 as well as for attorney disciplinary
proceedings, at least where "bad faith" is at issue and the attorney faces
suspension.218 Title IX hearings would also seem to be quasi-criminal in
nature.
The fact that Title IX hearings involve sex offenses may itself be
important. In 2015, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the state's
Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) violated due process when it used the
preponderance standard to adjudge the plaintiff a "level two sex offender,"
posing a "moderate risk" of re-offense.2 19 Said the court:
Although a preponderance standard is generally applied in civil
cases, the clear and convincing standard is applied when
"particularly important individual interests or rights are at
stake.". . .
... Balancing the Mathews factors, we conclude that sex
offender risk classifications must be established by clear and
convincing evidence in order to satisfy due process.
. . . "Classification and registration entail possible harm to a sex
offender's earning capacity, damage to his reputation, and, 'most
important,... the statutory branding of him as a public danger."'
Internet dissemination ... magnifies these consequences.
Although the State has a strong interest in protecting the public
from recidivistic sex offenders, allowing SORB to make
classification determinations with a lesser degree of confidence
does not advance that interest.220
The SORB case is hardly controlling in the Title IX context, but it can't
be entirely ignored. Both SORB and Title IX hearings are noncriminal
proceedings; both determine whether an individual is a sex offender; and both
create a documentary record of a person's sex offender status, made available
to others. Many individuals found guilty of sexual assault in Title IX hearings
have also had their names disseminated over the media or Internet, subjecting
Id. at 582 n.31 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
217. City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 291 N.W.2d 452, 459 (Wisc. 1980).
218. "In attorney suspension and disbarment cases, the finding of bad faith must be supported
by clear and convincing proof." White v. Reg'l Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 632 F. App'x 234, 236 n.1
(5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Crowe v. Smith, 261 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 2001)). But see, e.g., Jones v.
Conn. Med. Examining Bd., 72 A.3d 1034, 1041 (Conn. 2013) (upholding the preponderance
standard in physician license revocation proceeding); see also Steadman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
450 U.S. 91, 96-97 n.15 (1981) (upholding on statutory grounds the preponderance standard in SEC
broker registration revocation proceedings, although noting that petitioner had not argued a
constitutional violation).
219. Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 41 N.E.3d
1058, 1060-61 (Mass. 2015).
220. Id. at 1068-72 (citations omitted).
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221them to vilification and adverse consequences. Indeed, from a certain point
of view, the great accomplishment of the Dear Colleague letter was, under
the aegis of an antidiscrimination statute, to turn every school in the country
into a Sex Offender Registry Board.
Massachusetts SORB classifications, however, impinge on rights more
severely than do sexual assault determinations under Title IX. For example,
"level two sex offenders" must comply with self-reporting requirements
whenever they move.2 2 Failure to do so can lead to incarceration,2 23 and
offenders' names can be officially, publicly disseminated.224
But the potential consequences of a Title IX conviction of sexual assault
are undoubtedly grievous and in some cases life-damaging. Students not only
face expulsion and calumny; the expulsion and its reasons may be noted on
their academic record, making it very difficult for them to complete their
education because other schools won't admit them. The case for a higher
standard of proof in the Title IX context probably comes down to the
combination of these potentially life-damaging sanctions with the
uncomfortable fact (mentioned earlier) that in campus sexual assault cases,
there is frequently no evidence of the offense other than the complainant's
statement.225 Because such cases often come down to a "'he said/she said'
conflict," critics have questioned using a proof standard that "requires a
finding of responsibility even if the factfinder is almost 50% sure that the
accused student is not guilty." 226
Supporters of the Dear Colleague letter sometimes respond that a higher
standard of proof would perpetuate the invidious calumny that rape victims
are lying. According to Nancy Chi Cantalupo, applying a clear and
221. See, e.g., Richard P6rez-Pefia, At Yale, the Collapse ofa Rhodes Scholar Candidacy, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/sports/ncaafootball/at-yale-the-
collapse-of-a-rhodes-scholar-candidacy.html [https://perma.cc/U8P8-7L5C] (revealing the identity
of a Yale student investigated for sexual assault while maintaining the confidentiality of the story's
sources: "This account of the accusation against Witt ... is based on interviews with a half-dozen
people with knowledge of all or part of the story; they all spoke on the condition of anonymity
because they were discussing matters that the institutions treat as confidential."); Cathy Young,
Columbia Student: I Didn't Rape Her, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast
.com/columbia-student-i-didnt-rape-her [https://perma.cc/Z9VB-RAAX] (describing social media
attacks on a student acquitted of sexual assault at Columbia and stating that a "Tumblr post that
began to circulate last September said, 'The name of Emma Sulkowicz's rapist is Jean-Paul
Nungesser. Don't let him have any feeling of anonymity or security. Rapists don't get the luxury of
feeling comfortable."'); supra Section L.A (describing an alleged episode of this kind at Brandeis).
222. Doe, SORB No. 380316,41 N.E.3d at 1065.
223. Id. at 1065-66 ("If ajudge determines that incarceration is a more appropriate penalty for
a noncompliant offender than a fine, the judge now must impose a mandatory minimum sentence of
at least six months.").
224. Id. at 1066.
225. Weizel, supra note 178, at 1649.
226. Open Letter from Members of the Penn. Law Sch. Faculty, Sexual Assault Complaints:
Protecting Complainants and the Accused Students at Universities 2 (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://media.philly.com/documents/OpenLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4JS-9NZY].
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convincing proof standard to sexual assault cases would imply a "societal
belief that victims lie," and "in the context of sexual violence, a systemic
assumption that victims lie is a kind of gender-stereotyping that is widely
recognized as a violation of equality rights ... ."227
It's hard to know how to respond to this kind of argumentation.
Undoubtedly rape victims have historically been228-and often still are-
outrageously disbelieved and doubted.229 But not all sexual assault claims are
true; the question is what to do about that fact, and on that score Cantalupo's
argument doesn't seem helpful. Indeed it seems badly mistaken.
First, higher standards of proof cannot be equated with systemic
assumptions about accusers' veracity. For example, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt isn't required in criminal law because of a "societal belief'
that most witnesses or prosecutors are lying. It's required because some
accusations are wrong, and the Constitution demands an extremely high
degree of confidence when individuals face the special punishments and
stigmatization associated with criminal liability. Similarly, a school like
Yale, which requires clear and convincing evidence in cheating cases, does
not do so because of a "systemic assumption" that the accusers, whoever they
may be, are lying.
More fundamentally, it's difficult to understand how a school that used
the clear and convincing evidence standard in all its disciplinary proceedings
could possibly be said to be implying anything invidious about sexual assault
complainants. Prior to the Dear Colleague letter, no school I know of singled
out sexual assault cases for a higher proof standard than it applied in other
cases. The schools previously using the clear and convincing standard for
sexual assault cases did so for all serious disciplinary charges. The claim that
such schools were implying anything special about sexual assault
complainants seems based more on ideology than logic.
Perhaps the presumption of innocence itself is the issue here. Many
Title IX activists feel that it is imperative not to question the validity of sexual
assault claims,230 suggesting a kind of reverse presumption-that all sexual
227. Cantalupo, supra note 212, at 289.
228. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1094 (1986); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be
Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1013, 1028-29 (1991).
229. Christopher Ingraham, How a Vicious Cycle ofSkepticism Keeps Cops from Treating Rape
Seriously, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/11/13/how-a-vicious-cycle-of-skepticism-keeps-cops-from-treating-rape-seriously/
[https://perma.cc/6MAE-CCYA].
230. See, e.g., Supporting a Survivor: The Basics, KNOW YOUR IX, https://www.knowyourix
.org/for-friends-and-fami/supporting-survivor-basics/ [https://perma.cc/M84L-MWQR] ("DO
NOT: Question the validity of the victim's claims.... Having someone question whether or not a




assault claimants are, or must be assumed to be, victims. This way of thinking
is sometimes explicitly embraced:
In this book we will be using the term victim to refer to people who
claim to have been sexually assaulted. Even if the alleged perpetrator
was not found guilty, that does not mean that the person assaulted does
not still feel like a victim. In fact, the victim may suffer from a more
severe case of rape trauma ... if she thinks that no one believes her.231
Note that over the course of these sentences, the person who "claim[s]
to have been sexually assaulted" becomes, simply, "the person assaulted." If
it's assumed that all rape complainants are rape victims, any proof standard
will seem too high. The presumption of innocence will itself seem grotesque.
"I'm really tired of people suggesting that you're somehow un-American if
you don't respect the presumption of innocence," said adjunct law professor
Wendy Murphy in 2006, as the Duke lacrosse sexual assault case was
unfolding, "because you know what that sounds like to a victim? Presumption
you're a liar." 23 2
The reality and the problem is that some sexual assault claims are false.
Unfortunately, it's impossible to know how many. An often-repeated claim
asserts that only two percent of rape allegations are false,233 but the figure
seems to be one of those self-perpetuating statistics with no evidence behind
it.2 34 A 1994 study found that the true figure was closer to forty percent,235
but that study is extremely controversial and subject to numerous
criticisms.2 36 Recently, it has become common to assert that a 2%-8% false-
reporting rate is the "accepted" figure,2 37 but again acceptance seems to mean
only that the figure is repeatedly stated; the analysis putatively supporting it
appears to be highly misleading.238
231. CAROL BOHMER & ANDREA PARROT, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: THE PROBLEM
AND THE SOLUTION 5 (1993).
232. STUART TAYLOR JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL
CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 166 (2007).
233. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY
125 (1997); Torrey, supra note 227, at 193.
234. See RAPE INVESTIGATION HANDBOOK 237-40 (John 0. Savino & Brent T. Turvey eds.,
2011) (discussing studies contradicting the 2% figure).
235. Eugene J. Kanin, False Rape Allegations, 23 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 81, 84 (1994).
236. See, e.g., Philip N.S. Rumney, False Allegations of Rape, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 128, 139
(2006).
237. E.g., Donna Zuckerberg, He Said, She Said: The Mythical History of the False Rape
Allegation, JEZEBEL (July 30, 2015), http://jezebel.com/he-said-she-said-the-mythical-history-of-
the-false-ra-1720945752 [https://perma.cc/DB2Z-WF42] ("The most commonly accepted statistic
is that 2-8 percent of rape allegations are false.").
238. See Francis Walker, How to Lie and Mislead with Rape Statistics: Part 2, DATA GONE
ODD (Jan. 27,2015), http://www.datagoneodd.com/blog/2015/01/27/how-to-lie-and-mislead-with-
rape-statistics-part-2 [https://perma.cc/N3M4-4TQH] (arguing that the 2/o-8% figure is highly
misleading).
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A source that may be worth attending to on this point is the NCHERM
Group, a vigorous supporter of the Dear Colleague letter reforms, an
advocate of affirmative consent measures, and a leading firm in the provision
of assistance to Title IX officers, including supplying investigators to
schools.2 39 In 2014, the partners of that group published an open letter
warning "the public and the media" that "campus [sexual assault] complaints
are not as clear-cut as the survivors at Know Your IX would have everyone
believe" and that students are being found guilty when the evidence doesn't
support it.240 To illustrate, the open letter provided synopses of several cases
the firm had been recently asked to investigate, including:
A female student ... had spread rumors by social media that she had
been raped by a male student. When the rumors got back to the male
student, he approached her about it, and she offered him a lengthy
apology, and then put it in writing. We had to investigate nevertheless
[because the Dear Colleague letter requires an investigation whenever
school officials learn of a rape allegation], and she told us that they'd
had a drunken hook-up that she consented to. She was fine with what
happened. We asked her why she called it a rape then, and she said,
"you know, because we were drunk. It wasn't rape, it was just rapey
rape." We asked her if she was aware of what spreading such an
accusation might do to the young man's reputation, and her response
was "everyone knows it wasn't really a rape, we just call it that when
we're drunk or high."
A female student was caught by her boyfriend while cheating on him
with another male student. She then filed a complaint that she had been
assaulted by the male student with whom she had been caught
cheating. The campus investigated, and the accused student produced
a text message thread from the morning after the alleged assault. It
read:
Him: How do I compare with your boyfriend?
Her: You were great
Him: So you got off?
Her: Yes, especially when I was on top
239. Welcome to The NCHERM Group, LLC, NCHERM GROUP, LLC,
https://www.ncherm.org [https://perma.cc/SCS2-MW9F]; Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Brett A.
Sokolow, Setting a Realistic Standard of Proof in Sexual-Misconduct Cases, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Oct. 15, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Setting-a-Realistic-Standard/135084 [https://
perma.cc/E5LL-VMA6].
240. Open Letter from Brett A. Sokolow, President and CEO, NCHERM Grp., to Higher
Education About Sexual Violence 5 (May 27, 2014), https://www.ncherm.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/An-Open-Letter-from-The-NCHERM-Group.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RD6U-PXFV] [hereinafter "NCHERM Open Letter"]; see also Gersen & Suk, supra note 36, at
934-35 (discussing the NCHERM Open Letter).
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Him: We should do it again, soon
Her: Hehe
A male student performed demeaning, degrading and abusive sexual
acts on a female non-student. They engaged in BDSM, and he ignored
her protests throughout the entire sexual episode, despite her
screaming in obvious pain and trying to get away from him. She filed
a grievance with the campus, and we soon discovered instant messages
in which she consented just before the incident to exactly these acts,
and agreed to forgo the use of a "safe word" common in BDSM
relationships.241
These incidents are not offered as representative, and of course there are
vastly more cases of actual sexual assault. In fact, it's conceivable that in
each of the above cases there was an assault. The point and the worry, rather,
is that, according to NCHERM, accused students are being found guilty in
similar cases notwithstanding the lack of evidence, due to perceived
governmental pressure: "We could go on and on with a litany of these
complicated and conflicting cases. We hate that some of them provoke tired
old victim-blaming tropes," but "[w]e hate even more that in a lot of these
cases, the campus is holding the male accountable in spite of the evidence-
or the lack thereof-because they think they are supposed to, and that doing
so is what OCR wants."242 If true, a higher standard of proof would ameliorate
this problem.
The most forthright defense of the preponderance standard is also the
simplest: that its benefits outweigh its costs. A "more likely than not"
standard makes true claims of sexual assault easier to prove; that's a good
thing. Unfortunately, it does the same with false claims. There's no getting
around either of these facts. Under the "balancing test" prescribed by
Mathews,243 this price could be deemed perfectly defensible (after all, even
false findings of guilt can serve valuable deterrence goals). An extreme
version of this view was stated by an Oberlin student: "So many women get
their lives totally ruined by being assaulted and not saying anything. So if
one guy gets his life ruined, maybe it balances out."244
This position cannot be rejected out of hand. No metric exists for
weighing the costs to innocent individuals falsely found guilty against the
benefits of increased protection (assuming such increased protection
resulted) for actual and potential sexual assault victims. There is no a priori
241. NCHERM Open Letter, supra note 240, at 4-5.
242. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
243. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
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basis for claiming that the former outweigh the latter. But running roughshod
over the rights of people accused of crimes, or of conduct tantamount to
crimes, seems once again more indicative of ideology than logic; it is hard to
square with the fundamental commitments of American constitutionalism.
Moreover, those who engage in this kind of balancing should take into
account a cost that's frequently overlooked: damage to the credibility of
actual rape victims. Unreliable, closed-door campus sexual assault trials-
conducted under a low standard of proof, using unrecognizably broad
definitions of sexual assault, judged by incompetent personnel answerable to
administrations that have obvious conflicts of interest-may well be
reinforcing, not helping to overcome, skepticism about rape claims. As
Catharine MacKinnon said years ago, "It is not in women's interest to have
men convicted of rape who did not do it .... Lives are destroyed both by
wrongful convictions and the lack of rightful ones, as the law and the
credibility of women-that rare commodity-are also undermined."2 45
With a little ingenuity, and a little less ideology on both sides, new
solutions might be found to deal with this problem. For example, upon
meeting a lower standard of proof-whether a preponderance or something
even lower than that, like "substantial evidence"-a student claiming sexual
assault could be entitled to certain protective measures as well as medical,
psychological, and legal assistance. At the same time, clear and convincing
evidence could be held necessary before the accused could be seriously
sanctioned-for example, suspended, expelled, or designated a sex offender
on his educational record.246
Few judicial decisions have reached the question of the standard of
proof required by due process in (public) university disciplinary hearings.
One of the federal courts that did reach it-long before the current
245. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 131 (2005).
246. As an analogy, consider that, in many states, courts can issue domestic violence protective
orders based on a preponderance standard, and in some, such orders may issue upon meeting a
lower, "reasonable grounds" standard. AM. BAR AssoC., COMM'N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL
VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) BY STATE (2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/domestic-violence l/Charts/SA%20
CPO%2OFinal%202015.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPJ8-XHH6]. Some schools already
have policies allowing administrators to implement protective measures with no official standard of
evidence at all. In Yale's "informal" complaint process, for example, there is no required standard
of proof, and the Title IX Coordinator is empowered to provide "accommodations and interim
measures that are responsive to the party's needs as appropriate and reasonably available." YALE
UNIV., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, supra note 174, at 4 (2015), provost.yale.edu/sites/default/files/
files/UWC%20Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TTD-JQDP]. Such accommodations include:
providing an escort for the complainant; ensuring that the parties have no contact with
one another; providing counseling or medical services; providing academic support,
such as tutoring; and arranging for the complainant to re-take a course or withdraw
from a class without a penalty, including ensuring that any changes do not adversely
affect the complainant's academic record.
Id. at 10 n.8.
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controversies-suggested that due process might require clear and
convincing evidence at least where the student faces possible expulsion and
where the charge involves conduct constituting a criminal offense.247
The ultimate question is whether the Constitution would permit the
government to adjudicate a sexual assault claim, order the expulsion of a
student as a sex offender, and have a notation to that effect placed in his
academic record, on a preponderance of the evidence. If so, there is no
constitutional problem. If not, then the Department of Education cannot
achieve that result by making schools do it on the government's behalf.
Conclusion
Constitutional law today is woefully unable to deal with privatization-
or even sometimes to see it. But the principles that would solve this problem
turn out to be simple. What government cannot itself do without violating
constitutional rights, it cannot induce private individuals to do. And
whenever the federal government privatizes its law enforcement powers,
constitutional restraints apply in full. They apply, that is, not only to
specifically mandated acts, but to the private parties' discharge of these
powers in their entirety.
This means that many of the post-2011 Title IX sexual assault rials that
took place, and still are taking place, all over the country were and are
unconstitutional. Some will be outraged by this conclusion. We have reached
a point where merely arguing for fair process can trigger charges of sexism,
rape apology, and so on.
As it considers new regulations to replace the Dear Colleague letter, the
Department of Education should bear two points in mind. First, if the
Department continues to require schools to try sexual assault cases, it should
not only ensure that public schools comply with due process; it should ensure
that private schools do so as well, because their trials will be equally subject
to the Constitution's due process constraints. Second, the entire business of
shadow courts trying rape cases on college campuses, severed from the
institutions of law enforcement, may be too deeply flawed to remedy. If a
murder allegedly took place on a college campus, most of us would
strenuously object were the school to keep the matter secret, never informing
law enforcement, and instead convening a secretive trial of its own in which
faculty, school administrators, and students sat as judges and juries. We
should have the same reaction when the alleged crime is rape.
Future historians will wonder how we went through this looking glass.
They will ask what combination of activism and appeasement, of real
victimization and false victim-mongering, could have led to this new hysteria
in which a morning kiss becomes an act of "sexual violence," its perpetrator
247. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 797 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
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to be marked with a scarlet letter, and all this done under the trappings of law,
but where the proceedings take place in such secrecy that the accused isn't
even to know what he is accused of They will wonder how so many in
positions of respect and authority, who knew or should have known what was
happening, not only at Brandeis but around the country, willingly participated
or did not speak.
That history remains to be written.

